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Introduction 
 
 
 
 Christopher Gustavus Memminger faced the insurmountable task of 
financing the Confederate States of America.  Appointed Secretary of the 
Treasury in February, 1861, Memminger was unprepared for the realities of war.  
A poor leader, he pursued a financial policy that drove the Confederate economy 
into arrears.  Few historians, other than his biographer and Chief Clerk Henry D. 
Capers, have defended him.  Some have chastised him.  However, most 
historians acknowledge a myriad of factors in the Confederacy’s financial 
collapse.  In his foreword to Douglas B. Ball’s, Financial Failure and Confederate 
Defeat (1991), Frank E. Vandiver writes, “ ‘Conventional wisdom’ has long held 
the convenient view that the Confederacy collapsed from myriad causes; those 
historians who could deduce one more possible cause deserved a gold rung on 
the scholarly ladder!  Indeed, the more complex the mélange, the sounder the 
theory…. considering the normal complexity of historical causes, this view has 
obvious merit.”1 
Confederate financial problems had their roots in the antebellum South.  
As the world’s largest supplier of raw cotton, the bulk of the southern economy 
was at the hands of a small number of wealthy planters.  The slaves who picked 
the cotton represented 19 percent of the antebellum United States $16 billion
                                                 
1
 Douglas B. Ball, Financial Failure and Confederate Defeat (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 
1991), x. 
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 total wealth.  The secondary and tertiary economic effects from slavery meant 
that planter interests prevailed, and many non-planter whites showed deference 
for planter values and ideology.  With planters making up 40 percent of 
Congress, they were well represented.  However, a problem arose when planters 
pursued their own self interest, rather than supporting a nation established for 
their benefit.  The South also enjoyed one of the lightest tax burdens of any 
nation.  When war broke, public opinion in the South was strongly divided on the 
government’s power to tax.  Finally, nearing the end of the Free Banking Era, the 
South lacked the financial infrastructure to effectively guide a wartime economy.   
During the course of the war, over 57 percent of the Confederacy’s 
revenue relied on non-interest bearing Treasury notes.  Bonds and interest-
bearing debt made up 36.5 percent while taxes accounted for just 3.6 percent.  
All other non-debt revenue equaled 2.6 percent.  This over-reliance on Treasury 
notes caused a remarkable inflation, unseen in the United States to this day.2   
This study follows the analysis of Confederate finance in J.C. Schwab’s 
The Confederate States of America (1901), Richard Cecil Todd’s Confederate 
Finance (1954), and more recently, Douglas B. Ball’s Financial Failure and 
Confederate Defeat (1991).  Both Schwab and Todd restricted their studies to a 
narrative account of Confederate finance.  Ball has criticized both works, stating, 
“they make little effort to try to ascertain why Confederate officials did what they 
did, or why the Confederacy did not manage its affairs more efficiently…. 
Schwab and Todd explicitly assume that no matter who was secretary of the 
                                                 
2
 Richard C.K. Burdekin, & Farrokh K. Langdana, “War Finance in the Southern Confederacy, 
1861-1865.” Explorations in Economic History. 30 (1993): 352-376, 355.   
 3
treasury, or what laws were passed, the result would have been the same.”3  
Ball’s account is very critical of Memminger and argues that his shortsighted 
policies and lack of fiscal leadership were major factors in the Confederacy’s 
downfall.  Vandiver sums up Ball’s position in his preface, “Christopher G. 
Memminger, is shown as a confused, recessive misfit; executive policies reveal 
either abysmal ignorance of American financial experience or egregious 
optimism.”4   
Though Ball’s book is a remarkable piece of scholarship, it fails to fully 
place itself within the historical realities of the time.  Memminger’s weak policies 
were a compromise between his own financial strategy and that of Congressmen 
representing the desires of their constituents.  Ball also suggests that 
Memminger should have implemented an overly-ambitious tax policy, one that 
never would have passed a House dedicated to softening all burdens on the 
planting community.  Finally, in his counterfactual appendices detailing “A More 
Effective Financial Policy,” Ball forgets that Memminger was only one man.  In 
Charles W. Calomiris’s review of the book, he states, “Ball expects a great deal 
of activism from Memminger—regulation of bank loans and bank fund transfers 
and central management of commodity markets—but the country was fifty years 
from the creation of a central bank and from significant centralized control over a 
wartime economy.”5  
                                                 
3
 Ball, Financial Failure and Confederate Defeat, 16.   
4
 Ibid., x. 
5
 Charles W. Calomiris, “Review of Financial Failure and Confederate Defeat, by Douglas B. 
Ball,” Journal of American History, 79 (December 1992): 1179-1180, 1179.  
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This paper, though not a defense of Memminger, attempts to lessen the 
force of Ball’s criticisms.  It illustrates a number of contentious social, economic, 
and political factors that the Secretary competed with in his day-to-day affairs.  
Memminger’s financial policy was constantly at odds with a House and Senate 
comprised of 40 percent planters.  The antebellum South’s tax burden was so 
light that wartime taxation schemes came as a shock.  Individual states 
questioned the power of the central government to tax.  As for loan subscriptions, 
planter patriotism only went so far.  Planters wanted to sell their goods for the 
best price.  If the government could not oblige, they went elsewhere.  In short, 
the Confederacy, a newly established nation at war, had an economic structure 
and mindset too primitive for a sophisticated financial policy.  Given these 
factors, this paper will argue that the scope and talent needed to pursue an 
effective financial policy within the Confederacy was beyond the capacity of any 
man. 
 5
 
Chapter I 
 
The Antebellum Economy 
 
 
 
“Would any sane nation make war on cotton?   Without firing a gun, without 
drawing a sword, should they make war on us we could bring the whole world to 
our feet….Cotton is King.”6   
       James Henry Hammond, 1858.  
 
 The rudimentary nature of Confederate finance had its roots in the 
antebellum South.  The South was an agrarian economy dependent mainly on 
cotton.  Southerners, both as members of the Democratic Party, and as states’ 
rights advocates, opposed a national banking system and had little imagination 
for financial instruments.  Furthermore, the South enjoyed one of the lightest tax 
burdens in the world. 
 
“King” Cotton 
 
The antebellum South was the world’s largest supplier of raw cotton.  
Confined mainly to South Carolina and Georgia in 1800, cotton cultivation 
expanded rapidly when the southwestern lands were thrown open to settlement
                                                 
6
 James H. Hammond, Selections from the Letters and Speeches of the Hon. James H. 
Hammond, of South Carolina (New York:  John F. Trow & Co., 1866), 311-322. 
 6
 in 1820.  Between 1840 and 1860, the United States produced almost two-thirds 
of the world’s cotton supply.  In the late 1850s, the South supplied 77 percent of 
the 800 million pounds used by Britain, 90 percent of the 192 million pounds 
used by France, 60 percent of the 115 million pounds consumed by Germany, 
and upwards of 92 percent of the 102 million pounds consumed by Russia.7  For 
the year ending August 30, 1861, cotton accounted for 86 percent of the value of 
southern exports—the bulk of which (80 percent) went to Great Britain.  The 
closest export to cotton was leaf and manufactured tobacco at 8 percent.8   
 The antebellum South was a predominantly agrarian economy.9  There 
was some industry, but it was mostly comprised of small local units.  The 
southern factories of those days were small, old-fashioned mills, built near 
riverbanks, and usually powered by the flow of a stream.  Industrial capitalism 
had made a few inroads by 1860—utilizing mostly isolated centers along the 
seaboard and in the upper South.  A few southern industrialists were even able 
to adapt slavery to factory conditions.  However, these were exceptions.  The 
bulk of the southern economy remained dependent on cotton.10  
 
Slaves were the backbone of the cotton economy, and they represented 
tremendous wealth.11  Slaves accounted for almost 19 percent of the $16 billion 
national wealth.  Southerners knew their general economic well being came from 
                                                 
7
 Sven Beckert, “Emancipation and Empire: Reconstructing the Worldwide Web of Cotton 
Production in the Age of the American Civil War,” American Historical Review 109 (December 
2004): 1406. 
8
 Thomas F. Huertas, “Damnifying Growth in the Antebellum South,” Journal of Economic History 
39 (March 1979): 87-100, 90.   
9
 The North, too, was mostly agrarian, but possessed a far stronger industrial base.   
10
 Emory Q. Hawk, Economic History of the South (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1934), 310. 
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slavery, despite that only one-fourth of southern families owned slaves. The 
income generated from slavery had secondary and tertiary effects; 
transportation, banking, government, and urban and legal services prospered 
from slavery.12   
 Among the quarter of southern families that owned slaves, there were few 
who belonged to the planter class—those who owned twenty or more slaves.  
With 1.5 million heads of families in 1860, only forty-six thousand were 
considered planters.  More specifically, belonging to the planter class included 
the ownership of a considerable amount of acreage (a minimum of five hundred 
acres).  About 340 slaveholders owned more than 250 slaves.  Almost all these 
elite planters owned land that in more than one county, and about one third held 
property in more than one state.  For example, Edward Lloyd IV of Maryland 
owned plantations in Mississippi and Louisiana.  However, these men were rare 
exceptions.  An estimated 60 percent of slaveholders owned five slaves or less.13 
 Planter interests prevailed in the South.  Planters exercised hegemony in 
southern society while many non-planter whites showed deference for planter 
values and ideology.14  Southerners blended the traits of aristocracy and 
                                                 
12
 James Huston, Calculating the Value of the Union: Slavery, Property Rights, and the Economic 
origins of the Civil War (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 27 ; Emory M. 
Thomas, The Confederate Nation 1861-1865 (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 6. 
13
 William Kauffman Scarborough, Masters of the Big House: Elite Slaveholders of the Mid-
Nineteenth-Century South. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2003. 456-484.; 
Thomas, The Confederate Nation, 6. 
14In Frank Lawrence Owsley’s classic study Plain Folk of the Old South. Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1949., he argues that planters depended on non-slaveholding whites 
politically for votes, economically for vital skills and jobs, and socially for companionship and 
respect.  Owsley’s argument counters earlier accounts by Frederick Law Olmstead and historian 
U.B. Phillips of plain southerners as minor figures.  More recent scholarship includes Mark 
Wetherington’s book Plain Folk’s Fight: The Civil War and Reconstruction in Piney Woods 
Georgia.Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005. Wetherington argues that the 
common folk fought for more than the region’s elites.  Fearing emancipation would bring slaves 
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democracy within the same social structure.  This was due in part to the ambition 
of common people to someday enter the slaveholding class.  For 
nonslaveholding whites, buying a slave was a way of coming into a society that 
traditionally excluded them.  Take the example of John M. Tibeats of Rapides 
Parish, Louisiana.  In 1842, Tibeats purchased what he believed to be a slave, 
but turned out to be Solomon Northrup, a kidnapped free black from New York.  
Later recording his experiences in Twelve Years a Slave (1853), Northrup 
described Tibeats as “a small, crabbed, quick-tempered, spiteful man.  He had 
no fixed residence that I ever heard of, but passed from one plantation to 
another, wherever he could find employment.  He was without standing in the 
community, not esteemed by white men, nor even respected by slaves 
(emphasis added).”15  The possibility of one day owning slaves kept many 
common people loyal to the slaveholder society.16   
 
Taxation 
 
The antebellum South enjoyed a relatively light tax burden.  On a national 
level, between 1817 and 1861, Congress levied no taxes other than the tariff.  
Therefore, the history of antebellum taxation occurs mostly on a state and local 
                                                                                                                                                 
from the plantations to subsistence areas, common folk fought to keep the antebellum patriarchy 
intact.   
15
 Solomon Northrup, Twelve Years a Slave (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1968), 74. 
16
 Walter Johnson, Soul By Soul: Life Inside the Antebellum Slave Market (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1999), 80.  
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level.17  Only three states, Virginia, Alabama, and North Carolina, attempted to 
levy an income tax.  In Virginia, land outside of towns was taxed at given rate on 
each one hundred dollars of its assessed value.  Personal property was taxed by 
a system of specific levies.  For instance, in 1849, horses, mules, and colts were 
taxed at ten cents, gold watches at one dollar and so on.  In 1843, Virginia 
enacted an income tax law and became the first state to do so.  It was entirely 
supplemental and was regarded as an experiment.  In 1842, the state taxed 
dividends on bank stocks, and in 1844 the general assembly adopted a collateral 
inheritance tax.  This, however, was no more than a fiscal curiosity and a feeble 
effort by the state to extend their taxing power.  In 1852, various real estate taxes 
were grouped into a single property tax at eighteen cents per hundred dollars of 
property.  By 1856, the tax was forty cents.  In the same year, the rate of tax on 
slaves over the age of twelve was $1.20.  General property tax remained the 
most important, yielding 90.4 percent of the total state tax of Virginia.18         
Alabama’s constitution specified, “All lands liable to taxation in this state 
shall be taxed in proportion to their value.”19  At first, Alabama’s taxation was 
nominal; enough to satisfy the needs of a simple economy.  However, following 
the Panic of 1837 and the subsequent depression, the state legislature enacted 
an income tax of 0.5 percent on certain business incomes.  In 1848, the tax was 
broadened to “every person of whatever craft, employment or profession except 
                                                 
17
 Robin L. Einhorn, American Taxation, American Slavery (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2006), 201. 
18
 Hawk, Economic History of the South, 370-373. 
19
 Constitution of the State of Alabama Dec 6, 1819 (Huntsville, 1819).   
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artisans and manual laborers.”20  In 1848, the state enacted an inheritance tax of 
2 percent.  Tax rates on slaves varied, with a high of $1.10 assessed on slaves 
between age fifteen and age thirty.  Cotton plantations and storage warehouses 
were taxed at 1 percent of their income.21   
In North Carolina, land, poll, and license taxes compromised the majority 
of tax receipts until the 1840s.  Like Alabama, the tax system widened in scope 
after the Panic of 1837.  In 1847, the state authorized an inheritance tax of 1 
percent.  In 1849, an income tax was levied on interest and profits.22   
The other southern states taxed in various ways:  South Carolina’s tax 
revenue came from land, slaves, securities, and licenses on businesses and 
professions.  In Georgia, land was divided by classes and taxed on a per acre 
basis.  In addition, there were various license taxes common to other states.  
Florida adopted a general property tax, as well as a license and a poll tax 
common to other states.  Mississippi enacted a land and personal property tax, 
and a host of license taxes.  Louisiana’s revenue came from a tax on land, 
specific taxes on slaves, livestock, and vehicles, as well as license taxes on 
certain businesses and professions.  In Texas, there was a general property tax, 
occupational tax, and poll tax.  However, at no time were the revenues from 
taxation adequate to meet ordinary state expenditures.  The rate of state taxation 
never exceeded one fifth of 1 percent.  In Arkansas, the chief sources of state 
revenue were taxes on land,—levied at the rate of one quarter of 1 percent—
                                                 
20
 Edwin R. A. Seligman, The Income Tax: A Study of the History. Theory, and Practice of Income 
Taxation at Home and Abroad (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1911), 405. 
21
 Hawk, Economic History of the South, 374-375.; Seligman, The Income Tax, 405.  
22
 Hawk, Economic History of the South, 377.   
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slave taxes, and various license taxes.  Missouri had a general property tax and 
continually expanded license taxes.  In Kentucky, the property tax was their 
greatest source of revenue.  Finally, Tennessee was funded by a land tax, a poll 
tax, and various license taxes.23   
 Owing to the hegemony of the planter class, “uniformity” clauses were 
added to several taxation schemes. These clauses dictated the scope of 
taxation, removing state taxation from legislative interference and majority rule.  
These clauses required that different forms of property be assessed in a uniform 
fashion and taxed at identical rates.24  Not limited to the South, by 1860, twenty 
of thirty-three states had adopted similar clauses.25  Beginning with Missouri in 
1820, uniformity clauses spread to Tennessee, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, and 
Texas.  These clauses emerged from political bargains struck between 
slaveholders and the yeomanry.  In exchange for greater political access—which 
included abolishing suffrage restrictions and a reallocation of legislatures— the 
yeomanry agreed to uniformity clauses guaranteeing “that democratized 
legislatures taxed slaves at the same rates as other forms of property—such as 
the land and livestock of the yeomen.”26  What this meant was that if a non-
slaveholding majority decided to tax slavery out of existence, it would be mutually 
assured destruction.  The same taxes levied on slaves would be levied on their 
property.  Indeed, this was only a problem in states where the non-slaveholding 
                                                 
23
 Ibid., 376-380. 
24
 Stephen Mihm, “The Peculiar Origins of American Taxation: Review of Robin L. Einhorn, 
American Taxation, American Slavery,” Reviews in American History 34 (2006): 458. 
25
 Einhorn, American Taxation, 202. 
26
 Ibid., 203-204.; Mihm, “The Peculiar Origins of American Taxation,” 458. 
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majority could pose a serious political threat.  Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and 
South Carolina did not pass uniformity clauses as they were unnecessary.27 
One notices that the rate of taxation on various items was generally kept 
within one or two percentage points.  Due to the powerful hegemony of planter 
class, taxation in the antebellum South was kept minimal out of fear of damaging 
the profits of slaveholders.28  To be sure, the yeomanry also opposed taxes that 
disturbed subsistence farming.   On a national level, slaveholders vociferously 
defended the protection of slave property from ad valorem taxation.  They had 
reason to feel this way.  Their lands and slaves formed the basis for both the 
economy and the tax structure of the South.  Cotton engendered a myriad of 
wealth-giving pursuits.  By virtue of their occupation, the planter minority felt they 
were already contributing their fair share.  And any productive tax would certainly 
have to tap into slave assets—one of the largest resources of the southern 
economy.29     
 
Capital Market Reputation 
 
Owing in part to past failures in repaying both foreign and domestic debt, 
the antebellum South had a poor capital market reputation, or securities market.  
In the 1830s several southern states issued debt on the New York, Philadelphia 
and London stock exchanges to raise capital for the establishment of Southern 
                                                 
27
 Ibid., 458. 
28
 Huston, Calculating the Value of the Union, 46. 
29
 George Ruble Woolfolk “Taxes and Slavery in the Ante Bellum South,” Journal of Southern 
History, 26 (May 1960): 196.; Rose Razaghain, “Financing the Civil War: The Confederacy’s 
Financial Strategy,”  Yale ICF Working Paper,  04-45 (2005), 3. 
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banks.  With the Panic of 1837 and depression that followed, many Southern 
banks were forced to close or suspend interest payments.  Arkansas, Florida, 
Louisiana, and Mississippi partially defaulted on bonds issued in London.  This 
damaged their credibility on markets abroad.  Jefferson Davis, then a U.S. 
senator from Mississippi, openly championed repudiation of state debt.  In the 
1830s, Mississippi floated $7 million in state bonds to establish the Planters’ and 
Union bank.  Due to the depression, the banks suspended interest payments in 
1841.  By 1842, the state had repudiated the Union bank bond, and voted by 
plebiscite to default on the Planters’ bank bond in 1852. Davis offered no 
forgiveness to bondholders on the London.  In a series of exchanges with The 
Times of London regarding Mississippi’s national default, Davis “ridiculed the 
‘crocodile tears’ which had been shed over the ‘ruined creditors’ and stated that 
Mississippi was not afraid of the verdict of the civilized world.”30   
 
Banking 
 
The antebellum United States had a tumultuous national banking history.  
The first American bank (1791-1811) was not renewed.  The second bank (1816-
1832) saw Andrew Jackson veto its recharter.  A proposal for a third bank was 
vetoed twice in 1841.  The Independent Treasury (1840-1841) was quickly 
                                                 
30
 Mark D. Weidenmier, “Gunboats, Reputation, and Sovereign Repayment: Lessons from the 
Southern Confederacy,” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper, 10960 
(2004):1,5. This incident was the only time in Davis’ career where he played a prominent role in 
economic controversy.  He had never claimed to be an economist; in his mind he was first and 
foremost a soldier.  His formative years and practically his entire public career was spent one way 
or another with the military. 
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repealed, though, when reestablished in 1846, remained until the Civil War.  
When Andrew Jackson refused to recharter the Second Bank of the United 
States, the country entered a period known as the “Free Banking Era.”  From 
1837 to 1863, states with free banking laws allowed banks to form without 
seeking special legislation.  Banks could also issue their own notes, directed by 
state authorities on the basis of state capital requirements.  On demand, banks 
had to redeem their notes with specie from the U.S. Treasury.  Newspapers and 
other financial publications indicated the market value and validity of free bank 
notes.  Notes were backed by securities, and the risk involved with these 
securities dictated their value.31  In the South, the primary designation of 
Southern banks was to lend planters money for expenditures that were 
economically feasible and socially acceptable in a slave society, such as the 
movement of crops or the purchase of land and slaves.32   
During these first seventy years of U.S. banking and financial systems, 
opposition remained sharply divided along regional and political lines.  
Federalists, Whigs, and Republicans supported a national bank.  Democratic-
Republicans, Jacksonians, and Democrats were staunchly opposed.  They only 
supported the Treasury as a “necessary evil.”  Regionally, northerners were 
mostly strong supporters of a national bank.  Southerners, both as members of 
the Democratic Party and staunch states’ rights advocates, were opponents.33 
                                                 
31
 "A lesson from the free banking era". Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis - Regional Economist 
(April 1996). http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3678/is_199604/ai_n8755671/ (Accessed 
June 24, 2009). 
32
 Eugene D. Genovese, The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society 
of the Slave South (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), 21. 
33
 Razaghain, “Financing the Civil War,” 6.  
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Christopher Gustavus Memminger 
 
 
 
On February 3, 1861, representatives from South Carolina, Mississippi, 
Florida, Alabama, Georgia, and Louisiana assembled in Montgomery, Alabama, 
to create the Confederate States of America.  Within five days, the temporary 
government adopted both a political structure and constitution.  On February 9, 
the Constitutional convention elected Jefferson Davis as President of the 
Confederacy.  Davis appointed Christopher Memminger, a lawyer from 
Charleston, South Carolina, as the Confederacy’s Secretary of the Treasury.34    
His previous qualification was his term as chairman of the Ways and Means 
Committee in the South Carolina House of Representatives.  Davis had originally 
chosen the popular Georgia Senator Robert Toombs.  However, he became 
Secretary of State when the man chosen for that position, Robert Barnwell, 
declined.  As a replacement for Secretary, Barnwell suggested Memminger.35  
This suggestion was not due to his financial experience, but to give South 
Carolina a position in the Confederate cabinet.36   
It is debatable whether Memminger was fit for the Treasury Department.  
Some years after the Civil War, Davis stated “Memminger… had a high 
reputation for knowledge of finance.  He bore an unimpeachable character for 
integrity and close attention to duties… [as] Secretary of the Treasury… he 
                                                 
34
 E. Merton Coulter, A History of the South Volume VII: The Confederate States of America 
1861-1865. Louisiana State University Press, 1950, 49. 
35
 Ball, Financial Failure, 28. 
36
 Ibid., 149. 
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proved himself worthy of the trust.”37  Henry D. Capers, Memminger’s biographer 
and Chief Clerk of the Treasury, saw him as a man of limited power executing 
the will of the Confederate Congress, “Memminger was but an executive officer.  
At no time was he given unlimited authority to act as his judgment alone would 
dictate in the management of the Confederate finances… On the contrary, he 
was never more than an officer executing the will of Congress.”38  Some critiques 
of Memminger were not as measured.  Edward A. Pollard of the Richmond 
Examiner stated, “The mind of the Secretary, so juvenile in financial matters, 
failed… to understand the simple idea of values, in the shape of credit.”39   
Memminger entered public office with a seriousness of purpose.  His work 
ethic and high moral standards led Pollard to consider him “a zealot in religion.”40  
Whatever else can be said of him, he did not lack the courage of his convictions.  
In 1835, 117 of 118 members of the Carolina legislature voted to “guard against 
the introduction of free Negroes and persons of color into this State, upon 
principles of public policy affecting her safety and her most vital interests.”  
Memminger was the only vote in opposition.41 
                                                 
37
 Richard Cecil Todd, Confederate Finance (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 
1954), 1. 
38
 Ibid., 2. 
39
 Ibid.  In Confederate Finance, Todd quotes J.C. Schwab, who claims that Memminger “had 
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There was no lack of legislative experience in the Confederacy as a 
whole.  During the first Congressional Congress, individuals who served 
previously in the U.S. Congress commanded forty-five of 106 House seats and 
thirteen of twenty-six Senate seats respectively. Senate President Alexander H. 
Stephens had served seven terms in the U.S. House, while Speaker of the 
House Thomas S. Bocock served eight.42  Memminger lured experienced United 
States Treasury officials from Washington, including Philip Clayton, an Assistant 
Secretary in James Buchanan’s administration, Charles T. Jones, who brought 
valuable forms and instruction books, and W.H.S. Taylor, who worked twenty-five 
years as second auditor in the United States government.43   
 
Conclusion 
 
 The antebellum South’s economic climate influenced Confederate 
financial policy.  As an agrarian, low tax regime, with a banking system 
designated for, and dominated by, planter interests, the South entered the Civil 
War with an inadequate fiscal strategy.  Southern political ideology dominated 
economics.  The antebellum ideological camp that supported states’ rights, an 
agrarian economy, and slavery—integrated into the Democratic-Republican, 
Jacksonian, and Democratic parties, and dominated by southerners—saw no 
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reason to compromise their views after secession.  The Confederacy was a one-
party state.  However, while northern industrial capitalism was measured in days, 
southern agrarian economics was measured in years—a troublesome prospect in 
a war that required quick-ready funds.44 
 
*** 
  Memminger’s tenure as Treasurer began in Montgomery in an office 
without a desk, chair, or writing paper.  His clerk Henry D. Capers—later his 
biographer—drew funds from Memminger’s own private bank account to furnish 
his headquarters.  His first funding request required him to float a loan at the 
Central Bank of Alabama on his own personal credit.  It was a telling precursor of 
events to come.45 
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Chapter II 
 
Taxation 
 
 
“Let our authorities then fearlessly task and stretch the public credit to the 
utmost, in order to carry on the war so that taxation may not crush to earth our 
already overburdened people”46 
      Wilmington (Del.) Journal, April 9, 1863. 
 
 The Confederacy’s tax program was wholly inadequate to finance a nation 
at war.  Less than 4 percent of the Confederacy’s total revenue came from taxes.  
Even in 1861, with Confederate morale at its zenith, Congress authorized a tax of 
just ½ percent on property.  From here, Congress found any excuse to delay or 
defer taxation until 1863, when the Confederacy’s probability of winning the war 
had declined significantly. Only then did states that had the most to lose from 
emancipation favor increasing taxes.47  
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Tariff and Blockade 
 
The Confederacy originally settled on an import tariff to finance the new 
nation.  Outside of South Carolina, tariffs were inoffensive.  They threatened 
neither the slaveholding class nor states’ rights advocates.  Furthermore, given 
the relatively low volume of southern imports from Britain, there was little chance 
of British retaliation.48 
However, when war broke, Abraham Lincoln declared the Confederacy’s 
coasts blockaded.  The Union Navy guarded ports south of North Carolina.  In 
time, the Union extended the blockade to include the coasts of North Carolina, 
Virginia, Wilmington, Charleston, Tampa, and Mobile.  The Confederate Treasury 
estimated that duties from the import tariff would equal $25 million dollars per 
year, yet between July 1, 1861 and January 13, 1862, they totaled just $63,000.  
As the provisional Congress had already floated a loan of $15 million in February 
1861, Memminger knew revenue from the tariff would not even make interest 
charges on the Confederate debt. 49 
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Direct Taxation and Cotton 
 
On May 10, 1861, Memminger called for a means of direct taxation, 
recommending for the following fiscal year Congress levy a property tax of $15 
million.  Memminger believed a strong taxation program would lessen the 
possibility of inflation.  Congress disagreed, suggesting $10 million an adequate 
amount.  They believed southerners would vigorously oppose a more ambitious 
tax program.  They were also uneasy about adopting a system of direct taxation.  
In their mind, actual collections were best left to individual states.50      
A number of factors accounted for Congress’s distaste of ambitious tax 
schemes.  One was planter hegemony carried over from the antebellum period.  
Though supporting the Confederacy to preserve their economic, social, and 
political interests, they had no intention of altering their way of life to preserve it.  
They were unwilling to make the sacrifices necessary of them in wartime.51       
More important, however, was the southern faith in Cotton.  While urging the 
Virginia Convention to secede in 1861, former president John Tyler warned the 
North “You cannot do without the cotton States…. The foundation of all the 
exchanges of the world, the clothing of the world, the commerce of the world, 
proceeds chiefly from them.”52  In referencing the Union blockade, Senator 
Iverson of Georgia stated, “We can live, if need be, without commerce, but when 
you shut out our cotton from the looms of Europe we shall see whether other 
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nations will not have something to do on that subject.”53  Southerners believed 
that if the South halted cotton production, Britain and France would intervene.  
Again, John Tyler stated, “An embargo of a single year would produce in Europe 
a greater amount of suffering than a fifty years’ war”54   
The same rhetoric was echoed overseas.  A London cotton reporter for 
DeBow’s review in 1860 wrote:  
 
     If a war should, at any time, break out between England and America, a general 
insurrection take place among the slaves, disease sweep off those slaves by death, or 
the cotton crop fall short in quantity, whether from severe frosts, disease of the plant or 
other possible causes, our mills would be stopped for want of cotton, employers would 
be ruined, and famine would stalk abroad among the hundreds and thousands of work-
people who are, at present, fortunately well employed.55 
 
The London Times, April 29, 1861 reported, “So nearly are our interests 
intertwined with America that civil war in the States means destitution in 
Lancashire”56  In France, an estimated 700,000 workers were dependent on the 
cotton industry.57   
Though there were other cotton producing areas on the globe, none 
compared in quality and practicability to that of the South.  An editor writing for 
the London Economist in 1859 noted that Brazil, Egypt and the West Indies all 
grew cotton, "but as an imimediate [sic] and practical question of supply, it is 
confined to America and British India."  But even India had its problems, “The 
conditions of supply from India differ very much from those which attach to and 
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determine the supply from America. In India there is no limit to the quantity of 
labor. There may be said to be little or none to the quantity of land. The obstacle 
is of another kind; it lies almost exclusively in lack of cheap transit.”  Another 
article in the London Economist on April 13, 1861 noted that Indian cotton yielded 
more waste, lost more in spinning, and was unusually full of dust and dirt.  
Moreover, it was likely to appear thin after washing.  American cotton was less 
likely to break in spinning machinery and yielded ten to twenty percent more 
yarn.58 
Despite all the praise and posturing, the South seriously miscalculated 
their cotton coercion strategy.  The years 1859 and 1860 saw unusually large 
cotton crops, totaling 8,322,856 bales.  In May 1861, England had manufactured 
and stored over 300 million pounds of cotton at home and in India, “the mill 
power at work [in Great Britain] was producing considerably more Yarn and Cloth 
than the markets of the world could take off, [causing] an accumulation of stocks 
in the hands of Spinners, Manufacturers and Merchants at Manchester.” 59  
Added to that was an enormous supply of raw cotton—1,105,780 bales in June, 
1861, compared to 636,960 in June, 1859.  France had 143,345 bales on 
December 31, 1861, compared to 46,750 in 1859.  If the South planned to coerce 
the powers of Europe in the war by withholding cotton, they could not have 
picked a worse year.60   
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Memminger Surveys the South 
 
Congress requested Memminger set out to assess each state and procure 
the “value of the property, the revenue system, and the amount collected during 
the last fiscal year in each of the Confederate States.”61  This was no easy task.  
The Confederacy, a newly formed nation at war, lacked a unified internal revenue 
system and had no established machinery for tax collection.  Memminger’s report 
to Howell Cobb on July 24 read: 
     The revenue system adopted in the several States is so difficult that it is impossible to 
reduce it into one form. Even the valuation of lands in some of them is made upon an 
arbitrary rule, without reference to their real value. Some of the States levy a poll tax on 
each slave; others value them, and impose an ad valorem tax. The subjects of taxation 
in each State are so various that they can be classified only by rejecting all except the 
principal items, which are set forth in the accompanying schedule. I have, therefore, 
concluded that I would best promote the design of Congress by ascertaining as nearly 
as possible the value of the general items thus classified, and leaving out the various 
subjects of which no return is made in many of the States.62 
 
 
From this mess, Memminger settled on six “principal items” for taxation: 
slaves, real estate, merchandise, bank stocks, railroad and other stocks, and 
money at interest.  With “the gross value of property in the States of [the] 
Confederacy [at]  $5,202,176,109,” Memminger concluded that “a tax of only fifty 
cents on each hundred dollars of property would raise twenty-six millions of 
dollars.”63  This was much larger than the $10 million Congress originally settled 
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on, but in Memminger’s words “events which have occurred since the 
adjournment of Congress require a larger sum than was then supposed. At least 
twenty-five millions of dollars ought to be raised for the wants of the Government, 
and to sustain its credit in taking up…loans…. There should be a supply of 
means abundantly sufficient to pay the interest and part of the principal of such 
loans.”64 
Based on Memminger’s suggestions, Congress passed the War Tax Act 
of August 19, 1861.  Its passage was timely; Congress authorized an issue of 
treasury notes up to $100 million on the same day.65  The war tax was a tax on 
property equal to ½ percent of assessed value, exempting those holding less 
than $500 in property.  As it was up to individual states to collect taxes, 
Memminger appointed a chief collector for each state.  Collectors were 
responsible for dividing each state into collection districts and appointing 
assessors to appraise all taxable property before November 1, 1861.  
Assessment forms were due no later than December 1.  Actual collections were 
to take place April 1, 1862.  If states paid the full-assessed sum prior to April 1, 
1862, they received a 10 percent discount to compensate for collection 
expenses.66   
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Opinion 
 
Public opinion on the war tax was mixed.  The Richmond Examiner 
declared that the government was an inappropriate vehicle for direct taxation, 
and that the Confederacy should finance their war with loans, not taxes.  The 
Asheville News ran an editorial that roared “DIRECT TAXATION WAS 
TYRANNY.”67  Others supported the tax.  DeBow’s Review ran an article in their 
October-November issue stating  
     Without a scheme of internal taxation, the whole dependence of the Government, for 
its own support and for the extraordinary expenses of the war, would be upon loans and 
the credit of the Confederacy in the form of treasury notes.  There must surely be some 
limit beyond when the expedient of borrowing cannot be carried.  Without some revenue 
from other sources, even the interest on the former loans must be paid with borrowed 
money, and thus, the mass of indebtedness would so be accumulated to such an extent 
that, if the ability of the people to lend were not exhausted, the public credit would be 
ruinously impaired and the Confederacy ultimately reduced to discredit or bankruptcy.68 
 
 
Tax Collection in the States 
 
Collection moved slowly.  Forms came to assessors late because paper 
was scarce.  Many printers and binders had joined the army.  It took Memminger 
almost a month to present a list of nominees for Chief Collector to President 
Davis.  A month after that, Memminger was still getting his staff qualified.  His 
final list was not ready until December 13, 1861.  After four months of 
organization, Congress accepted this list and authorized further postponements if 
necessary.69 
                                                 
67
 Ball, Financial Failure, 221. 
68
 “The War Tax,” Debow’s Review, 31 (October-November 1861): 436.   
69
 Lerner, “Monetary and Fiscal Programs,” 509.  
 27
 States’rights sentiments echoed throughout the Confederate taxation plan, 
as tax collection was left to individual states.  Alabama Governor Andrew B. 
Moore stated 
     The State should never concede to the General Government the exercise of powers 
not delegated in the Constitution, and they should never, except in cases of absolute 
necessity, consent to the exercise of power or to perform duties which do not properly 
belong to them… The collection of this tax by the state would be an onerous and 
unpleasant duty, as it imposes upon the state the necessity of enforcing the laws of the 
Confederate government against her own citizens.70 
 
By April 11, 1862, Alabama’s chief collector had neither completed the personnel 
needed for his organization—his officers and sub officers—, nor distributed the 
necessary forms and instructions.  On this day, Union forces captured 
Huntsville—his residence—forcing him to flee.  His papers and documents were 
left behind.  He wasted two more months until the new Governor, John Gill 
Shorter, dismissed him.  In the end, Alabama borrowed the money from their 
state banks to pay the tax.71   
In Arkansas, fifteen of fifty-five collection districts fell to the enemy.  This 
made returns from these areas impossible. In addition, four hundred thousand 
dollars in taxes were illegally paid to a Confederate General’s Quartermaster.  
This issue had not been settled as late as January 1863.72   
Tennessee’s proximity to enemy forces placed it in a bad position.  The 
state’s chief collector became gravely ill shortly after his appointment.  After a 
significant delay and no improvement in the collector’s health, there was a 
second appointment.  However, before the second collector could qualify and 
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appoint his sub-committee, Nashville fell to Union forces.  Tax collection in the 
presence of the enemy was difficult, if not impossible, and the government had to 
flee.  Of Tennessee’s $2,205,000 assessment, the Treasury had collected just 
$1,499,766 by July 1863.73   
Virginia’s proximity to the enemy caused the same collection problems as 
Arkansas.  Furthermore, chief collector Colonel H.T. Garnett quarreled over 
taxation he believed to be “unjust, unequal and oppressive.”  For him, the 
problem was that “climate, soil and other causes, especially affecting slave 
property on the borders, adjacent to non-slaveholding territory all operate to 
depress or elevate values to such a degree that it is difficult to establish a just 
rule in the application of one price to all the same class.”74  By July 1863, 
Virginia’s outstanding balance was second only to Tennessee, with $341,738 still 
owed on a $2,466,738 assessment.75   
 
Assessment of the War Tax of 1861 
 
In total, out of a $19,418,392 assessment, $17,446,736 was collected—
almost 90 percent.  This meant, on paper, the War Tax Act of 1861 was a 
success.  The majority of the outstanding balance came from areas where it was 
difficult or impossible to collect.  However, several factors indicated that the tax 
was not successful.  First, it was collected slowly.  By July 1862, only two of 
eleven states had made full returns.  Six states had made no returns at all.  
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Second, the 10 percent discount offered for timely payment was too large.  For 
example, in Mississippi, actual cost of collections was closer to 2 percent.  
Another problem was the mobilization of a competent collections staff.  The task 
of training collectors for the appraisal and levy of taxes took time.  Added to this, 
the stipend offered to collectors was too inadequate to attract any real talent.76     
The most notable failure of the tax was the means by which the states 
settled their balances.  Of the eleven Confederate states, only three—South 
Carolina, Mississippi, and Texas—actually collected the money.  Other states 
assumed the obligations of their citizens and provided the funds themselves.  
These payments were not in specie.  In Arkansas, the legislature assumed the 
tax, and due to a lack of incorporated banks, borrowed the money by issuing its 
own warrants at 8 percent interest.  Alabama borrowed all its money from state 
banks.  Other states floated securities to pay their balances.  Therefore, a part of 
the tax was, in fact, a loan introduced by the states.77  Reasons for success in 
Texas and Mississippi came from their passive resistance.  They forced the 
Confederacy to collect it themselves.  The issue of states’ rights led states to 
assume the tax to prevent hardship and inconvenience.  Only 1.7 percent of the 
Confederacy’s total revenue—including loans and Treasury notes— came from 
the war tax of 1861.78   
 
 
                                                 
76
 Ball, Financial Failure, 226.  The government had not even made a provision for travel 
expenses or postage.   
77
 J.C. Schwab, “The Finances of the Confederate States,” Political Science Quarterly 7 (March 
1892): 41. 
78
 Lerner, “Money and Fiscal Programs,” 510.  
 30
 
 
A Necessity Deferred 
 
For two years the Confederacy implemented no new taxes, despite a 
petition by Memminger in March, 1862.  Meanwhile, the Secretary of the United 
States Treasury recommended a tax of $50 million.  Congress believed this 
amount was too low.  Instead, the Union Tax Act of July 25, 1862 intended to 
levy $150 million in taxes.79 
Memminger issued a Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on January 
10, 1863, recommending—among other items—a new war tax on property and 
income.  Memminger knew the Tax Act of 1861 was insufficient, and that the 
Confederacy needed to secure further tax revenue as a basis for loans.  
Memminger preferred income taxes to stamp, excises, licenses, and the like.  
Such taxes “call[ed] for a machinery vexatious in its character and expensive in 
its operation,” whereas machinery established for the War Tax Act of 1861 could 
be used again. 80  Memminger insisted on a joint property/income tax as taxing 
property exclusively hurt those whose property yielded no income.  However, he 
was also aware of how easily it was to avoid paying income tax—in his words, an 
“insecure resource.”  Therefore, both means of taxation provided the government 
with two revenue streams while burdening the public as little as possible.81   
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Memminger recommended the war tax be payable in Treasury notes, for 
reason that the government could absorb part of the first issue, adding value to 
the currency— “If sixty millions of notes could be thus called in, the benefits 
resulting would fully counterbalance every possible hardship. The currency would 
promptly recover its value, the bonds would become an object of investment 
instead of being thrown on the market, and a sure and steady system of finance 
would be established.”82  In addition, forcing citizens to pay property taxes in 
currency provided a disincentive for subsistence living and a barter economy.  
This was essential for the Confederacy to survive as a note-issuing enterprise.   
Census estimates from 1860 on the value of all property in the 
Confederacy equaled $4.6 billion.  Memminger rounded this number to $4 billion 
in his report, for reason that the previous estimate did not factor in property 
captured by advancing Union armies.  Considering this, and other administrative 
difficulties, Memminger concluded a 1 percent property tax could yield $36 
million— almost double that of the last war tax.  Added to this was a 10 percent 
income tax, derived by calculating a 7 percent “average of interest in the 
Confederate States” from $4 billion.83 
Memminger made special provisions for an earlier decision by the 
Confederate Court of South Carolina regarding the power of Congress to tax 
state bonds.  According to the report, “The very large amount of money invested 
in this form was included in the war tax act of the last year, and the tax thereon 
was paid everywhere, except by those who raised the question in South 
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Carolina.”84  Memminger suggested Congress circumvent this ruling by taxing 
income on bonds directly in the hands of South Carolinians, “The taxing power 
over income in the hands of the citizen for consumption may be distinguished 
from that over State bonds, specifically as property.”85  However, until Congress 
established a Confederate Supreme Court, any attempt to tax bonds in South 
Carolina was useless.  The estimated loss on South Carolina’s ruling totaled $1 
million.  That a Supreme Court had not yet assembled to deal with this ruling 
gives credence to the sorry mess Memminger inherited. 
Anticipating Congress’s protestation over dramatic tax measures, 
Memminger’s report included a petition calling for its necessity.  Memminger 
asked for a tax that would go above what was necessary to pay the interest on 
the public debt.  He also urged Congress to continue to make portions of the debt 
“payable every six months after the probable termination of the war,” rather than 
utilizing a sinking fund.86 On this, Memminger provided the example of William 
Pitt the Younger’s introduction of a sinking fund in 1786 to decrease England’s 
national debt.  In arrears after the rebellion of the American colonies, Pitt’s 
sinking fund put a portion of the nation’s annual tax revenue into a fund where 
the principle could generate interest.  Eventually, the interest would be such that 
it could decrease or eliminate the debt.  The problem was that the fund provided 
too great a temptation for the government  
     The sinking funds devised by Mr. Pitt, and the great statesmen of his times, have 
proved deficient, not in principle, but in administration. The principle upon which they 
rest is the annual raising of an amount beyond the interest for the purpose of eventually 
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discharging the principle. The punctual investment of those surplus sums at compound 
interest by the mere operation of numbers, would be certain to discharge the debt in a 
given time. The failure of this plan, in its effects upon the public debt of England, arose 
from defects in its administration. As the invested fund increased in amount, it offered 
constant temptation to the Government to make use of it, and the party in power often 
preferred inventing pretexts to seize upon it, or to court public favor by calling off 
unpopular taxes required for its increase rather than continue or augment those taxes. 
Besides, the neglect to make punctual investments as the interest accrued had a 
constant tendency to reduce compound interest to simple; and thus it was found 
impossible, in a long course of years, to preserve the fund inviolate, or to maintain the 
constant supply from taxes, which the plan demanded.87 
 
 Memminger’s report also addressed the issue of salaries.  Indeed, this 
should have been dealt with in 1861.  The stipend offered then was too 
inadequate to attract any real talent.  Added to this was the temptation for a 
poorly paid official to steal —“ It is not a wise policy to confide large money 
arrangements to officers who are badly paid.”88  Patriotism alone was an 
inadequate counterbalance to modest stipends.    
 
Support for Memminger’s Plan 
 
The overall tone of Memminger’s report indicated his determinedness to 
make Congress enthusiastic about taxation.  And this time, the Southern press 
rallied behind him.  Newspapers claimed there was strong support for taxation; 
that it should be the burden of every citizen.  The Richmond Enquirer 
recommended a tax of $200 million and criticized the Confederate government 
for ‘taxation without representation,’ holding taxation as a last resort while note 
values depreciated.  The paper’s editor wrote, “Did ever nation before crave and 
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pray to be heavily and immediately taxed as this people is craving now… For 
God’s sake tax us.”  One Georgia editor wrote, “The error in the beginning was in 
not taxing heavily and severely enough.  The Congressman who is afraid of 
taxing the people is and ought to be regarded as a public enemy.”89 
Memminger even had the support of some politicians who believed that 
taxation was better than inflation—left unchecked, inflation was a far harsher tax.  
Inflation also did more damage to military and civil morale than did an income 
tax.   Most of all, the tyranny of taxation was little compared to the seizures by 
the Union and Confederate armies.  William M. Browne, former Acting Secretary 
of State criticized Congress for its apprehension about taxation: “they are afraid 
to pass a good tax bill & nothing else can save us from ruin.” Senator Hershel V. 
Johnson of Georgia warned that if Congress refused to tax, “universal ruin would 
be the consequence.”  Even President Davis rallied behind his treasurer, calling 
on Congress to tax.90   
 
A House and Senate Divided 
Despite pleadings from both Memminger and the press, it was not until 
February 25, 1863 that the House Ways and Means Committee suggested a bill 
levying a 1 percent property tax, an income tax, and a series of license taxes.  
The Senate was strongly opposed to property taxes.  Under the Provisional 
government, direct taxation was constitutional.  However, the permanent 
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government could only levy direct taxes according to representation, and the limit 
on the census was February 1865. On March 11, the issue came to a head 
House of Representatives.  Muscoe Garnett of Virginia offered the resolution 
that, “in laying direct taxes we are bound to observe that clause of the 
Constitution which declares that ‘No capitation or other direct tax shall be laid 
unless in proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be 
taken.’”91  Willis Machen of Kentucky moved to amend Garnett’s resolution by 
striking it out and replacing it with the words “That, in the opinion of this House, 
the first section of the bill for raising taxes is constitutional.”92  Augustus Garland 
of Arkansas tried to table the motion but was defeated 21-53.  When put to a final 
vote, the House approved Machen’s amendment 36-35.93   
 However, when the House forwarded the bill to the Senate, they chose a 
stricter constitutionalist view.  The House asked for a 14 percent tax on incomes 
up to $10,000, and 24 percent afterwards—income under $500 was exempt.  
The Senate recommended a 5 percent tax on incomes between $500 and $1500, 
10 percent on incomes between $1500 and $10,000, 12 ½ percent on incomes 
between $10,000 and $15,000, and 15 percent on figures in excess of $15,000.  
At this point, Memminger issued a special report urging for tax-in-kind on 
agricultural income, to which the Senate obliged. They provided for a tax of one-
tenth of agricultural products.94  
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Congress Approves the Bill 
 
  Congress approved a second war tax act on April 24, 1863.  A joint 
House-Senate committee labored for weeks on an acceptable compromise.  
Instead of taxes on land and slaves, the provision taxed every other conceivable 
item.  The assessment was scheduled for July 1, 1863 and payable October 1, 
1863.  The tax act provided the Treasury with the following:  
I.  An 8 percent property tax levied on all naval stores, salt, wines and 
liquors, tobacco, cotton, wool, sugar, molasses, syrup, rice, and all other 
agricultural items beyond what was necessary for home consumption.  The same 
8 percent tax applied to all monies on hand or on deposit.  A 1 percent tax 
applied to all credits at home or abroad not employed in business. 
II.  A license tax levied on a variety of occupations, trades and businesses 
including bankers, auctioneers, retail dealers, tobacconists, peddlers, jewelers, 
apothecaries, photographers, confectioners, wholesale liquor dealers, 
pawnbrokers, distillers, butchers, bakers, hotels, theaters, circuses, jugglers, 
bowling alleys, stables lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and dentists.  The tax rate 
varied between $50 and $500 according to profitability.  In some instances, the 
tax rate was substituted with a tax on production or percentage or sales.  
III.  An income tax on salaries and other incomes payable every January 
1.  Salaries of $1500 or less were taxed at 1 percent, with 2 percent on salaries 
above $1500.   Military, naval, and salaries below $1000 were exempt.  In 
addition, income from other sources was taxed as follows:  Incomes less than 
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$500 were exempt.  Incomes from $500 and $1500 were taxed at 5 percent, with 
10 percent on the excess up to $5000, 12 ½ percent on the excess up to 
$10,000, and 15 percent on all income over $10,000.   
IV.  A 10 percent tax on profits from the sale of the following items: food 
products, iron, shoes, blankets, and cotton cloth.  This was a tax on wholesale, 
not retail profits, levied in 1863.   
V. A tax-in-kind of one-tenth of the agricultural produce in 1863.  Farmers 
were to deliver the goods to post-quartermasters no later than March 1, 1864.95 
Money from the first four items went to tax collectors, while the agricultural 
produce went directly to the army.  Cotton went to agents of the Confederate 
Treasury.  
 
Collection 
On May 15, 1863, Memminger gave instructions to his collection agents.  
His instructions placed particular emphasis on neglect.  Mindful of the 1861 
collection fiasco, Memminger stated, 
     If any person shall refuse or neglect to give lists or make return, within the time 
required by the assessor, for the collection district within which he may reside, the 
assessor may enter upon his premises, and upon view, or from state tax lists, any other 
record or documents, or by any other lawful ways and means, shall make a list, of all his 
taxable property, and duly assess the value thereof, and the tax thereon, and where 
there is no sufficient excuse, from sickness or other avoidable cause, he shall add 
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twenty-five per cent. [sic] to the amount assessed, and shall report the same as a good 
and sufficient list to the collector.96 
The tax remained in effect until 1865, save the 10 percent profit tax and 8 
percent tax on naval stores and agricultural products, which ended in 1863.97   
In order to assess and collect the war tax, Congress approved a new 
office, the Office of the Commissioner of Taxes, “for the purpose of 
superintending the collection of internal duties or taxes imposed… by laws, and 
of assessing the same.”98  On July 2, Thompson Allan was appointed Chief 
Commissioner.  His duties involved supervising and enforcing the laws pertaining 
to the assessment and collection of taxes.   
The Treasury divided each state into collection districts supervised by a 
State Collector.  State collectors appointed district supervisors, who then 
appointed appraisers to assess taxable items in their districts.  All assessments 
were made by officers of the Confederate Government.   As the machinery 
required was similar to that of 1861, it was set up quickly.  Yet the sheer 
complexity of the new tax produced considerable slowdown.  There were three 
different collection periods.  Dozens of items existed under various headings.  
Many liabilities could only be assessed on the good faith of the taxpayer—no 
other evidence existed.  The tax laws themselves were so ambiguous that 
assessors had to frequently rely on the authority of Commissioner Allan.  Indeed, 
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this caused such a delay that on December 23, 1863 a new set of instructions 
replaced all previous orders in attempt to expedite collections.99 
 
Opposition 
As mentioned, though the Provisional constitution gave Congress nearly 
unlimited power to tax, the Permanent constitution held stricter provisions.  It 
stated, “Representatives and Direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the 
several States which may be included within this Confederacy, according to their 
respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of 
free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years and excluding 
Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all slaves.”100  As such, objections echoed 
throughout the South.  The Charleston Mercury called the tax unconstitutional— 
it was direct, not apportioned as stated in the constitution.  Others tried to cheat 
the system, with distillers, speculators, and traders evading the tax entirely.  
President Davis acknowledged the problem of direct taxation, yet argued that 
until the 1865 Census, apportionment was impossible.101   
Still, the issue of direct taxation was a minor quibble when compared to 
the Tax-in-Kind—a tax loathed and disparaged by planters and small-farmers.  
One serious criticism lay in its unequal assessment.  Invading northern armies 
often disrupted collections.  In Arkansas, a treasury agent tried to contact A.B. 
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Greenwood, the state’s permanent collector.  The agent later reported, “Mr. 
Greenwood fled with his property from the state to avoid capture by the enemy 
and has settled in Texas.”102  Other isolated or hard-to-reach districts went free.  
This aroused the bitterness of small farmers in easily accessible regions—most 
of whom had never paid a tax-in-kind.  The produce collected was also 
mismanaged; much of it was stolen or left to rot in storehouses.  It was 
impossible to collect hay on small farms, as most farmers had no means of 
bailing it.  As a protection against fraud, all officers were reported to the 
Quartermaster General. However, there were several instances of unauthorized 
persons collecting the Tax-in-Kind.103  
 The tax was so unpopular in North Carolina that it was vehemently 
denounced it at public meetings.  One resolution declared, “the act of Congress, 
in secret session, without consulting with their constituents at home, taking from 
the hard laborers of the Confederacy one-tenth of the people’s living, instead of 
taking back their own currency in tax, is unjust and tyrannical.”  Another stated, 
“we pledge ourselves to each other to resist, to the bitter end, any such 
monarchical tax—any such contempt to our State—to pay such a tax to a Virginia 
tithing man.”  North Carolinians were willing to pay taxes in Treasury notes, but 
not produce.104   
 Southern hatred towards the Tax-in-Kind should not have surprised 
Memminger.  The best economic literature of the day spoke against it.  Jean 
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Baptiste Say’s A Treatise on Political Economy or the Production Distribution and 
Consumption of Wealth (1830)—a work widely read and respected in the 
South— stated that a tax-in-kind was “of all others, the most inequitable; for it 
makes no allowance for the advances in the course of production, but is taken 
upon the gross, instead of net profits.”  It is likely that Memminger read the 
treatise, as he listed his arguments for a produce tax in the same order as Say.  
Indeed, Memminger even made provisions for inequities by providing some 
exemptions.  However, Say’s objections went further: a tax-in-kind was difficult to 
collect; it required a legion of agents who were easy prey for temptation and 
corruption; it also required a vast number of storehouses to avoid spoilage and 
distressed sales.  In the Twentieth Century, Eugene Lerner remarked that taxes-
in-kind are highly inflationary.  Though real goods are removed from the market, 
the money supply remains constant.105  However, Memminger had little choice.  
The timing of his tax-in-kind recommendation coincided with the Senate’s 
protestation of the House’s income tax rate and the smaller senatorial offer.  The 
need of military provisions was such that the Tax-in-Kind was the best means of 
securing it.  Attempting to pay for produce with devalued Treasury notes delayed 
supplies from reaching the front lines.  And it was far better than impressment— 
the most hated of all taxes.  In a letter to Jefferson Davis on November 26, 1863, 
Secretary of War James A. Seddon wrote, “numerous difficulties of 
Quartermaster’s and Commissary Departments have necessitated ‘large 
necessary purchases and transportation of forage and subsistence’… wide 
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spread speculation has forced impressment, ‘the evils attending it are, however, 
very great… [it] is evidently a harsh unequal, and odious mode of supply’ and 
‘the sorest test’ of patriotism” [emphasis added].106 
 
Congress Relaxes the Tax-in-Kind 
Congress relaxed the much-hated Tax-in-Kind on both December 28, 
1863 and January 30, 1864.  The former allowed farmers to settle the tax on 
sweet potatoes in money—a considerable element of total southern production.  
The latter called for a similar provision on tobacco. These acts were less a kind 
gesture than a provision to alleviate transportation problems.  By the end of 
1863, produce collected by the Tax-in-Kind equaled just over $5 million.  North 
Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama contributed the most—almost two-thirds of 
produce collected came from these three states.   In his report of October 28, 
1864, the Commissioner of Taxes estimated revenue from the Tax-in-Kind 
totaled over $140 million.  This number is misleading, however, as inflation 
distorts the true figure.  In specie, total produce collected was closer to $7 million.  
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This equaled approximately 30 million pounds of rations—enough to feed an 
army of one million for a month.107 
 
New Recommendations 
On December 7, 1863, Memminger issued a report outlining the current 
monetary and fiscal problems of the Confederate government.  Already, the Tax 
Act of 1863 was insufficient; “the large increase in prices, and the consequent 
increase of demands on the government clearly show already that the tax, if even 
now realized, would be wholly inadequate to supply these demands.”108 An 
oversupply of devalued currency, coupled with a lack of supply, warranted the 
following recommendation: 1. The currency must be reduced; 2. The supplies 
must be raised; 3. The measures to attain these ends must be prompt and 
certain.  While the main goal of Memminger’s January 10 suggestion was a 
reduction of the currency, hostility towards taxes and the government’s ever-
increasing needs meant that taxation payable in a worthless currency would do 
little. At this point, the currency had already “attained dimensions of-five times its 
proper size.”  Memminger estimated the Confederacy’s needs for 1864 at $400 
million, and proposed raising $100 million in taxes—loans would account for the 
remained $300 million.  Assessing taxable property at $3 billion, Memminger 
recommended raising property taxes to 5 percent and issuing a new corporate 
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profit tax— one-half of the tax required in specie or bond.  He estimated tax 
proceeds at $120 million.  Half of this would purchase supplies, and the other half 
would pay the interest on a new billion-dollar loan.  The benefits of requiring half 
the tax in specie or bond were twofold: first, it would reduce the amount of 
Treasury notes in circulation; second, settling taxes in government bonds would 
create a demand for them.  Memminger also addressed the constitutional 
challenges to direct taxation.  Here, Memminger was blunt, “There is a general 
power to lay taxes which becomes subject to a special limitation as soon as an 
enumeration could be had.  That enumeration is ordered to be taken within three 
years; but it is prevented from being taken by the presence of a public enemy.  
Under such a state of things the limitations must be considered as in suspense, 
and the general power may be exercised.”109  In Memminger’s reasoning, an 
apportioned tax would fall exclusively on unoccupied portions of a state.  The 
least occupied states would pay the most in taxes, and therefore, “the greatest 
sufferers would be required to bear the heaviest burden.110 
By April 29, 1864, receipts from the previous tax act totaled 
$82,262,349.83.  Each state contributed the following:  Georgia, $22.3 million; 
Virginia, $21.5 million; South Carolina, $12.5 million, North Carolina, $10; 
Alabama, $9.5 million; Texas, $3 million; Mississippi, $2 million; Florida, $1 
million; Louisiana, $200,000; Tennessee, $141,000.  Arkansas paid nothing. 111    
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On Memminger’s recommendation, Congress approved a new general tax 
law on February 17, 1864.  It was a continuation of the previous tax act, with 
some modifications.  Congress accepted Memminger’s 5 percent property tax, 
and allowed for payment in bonds—which were taxed for the first time.  
Corporations were taxed at 25 percent, after a 25 percent discount.  There was a 
10 percent tax on gold and silver plate and jewelry.  The new law suspended the 
income tax from property, as well as the 8 percent tax on agricultural products.  It 
also suspended the 1 percent tax on credits at home or abroad not employed in 
business.  Real property was assessed at its 1861 value—unless sold after 1863, 
for which it was assessed at its current value.  Another key feature was a rebate 
system.  The 5 percent tax on agricultural property was credited against the Tax-
in-Kind, while the income tax was credited against the tax on property.  The law 
called for assessment upon passage, with taxes due July 1.  States west of the 
Mississippi received a 90-day extension.112   
 
“So Intelligent a Class” 
The laws were poorly conceived and unfair.  Doubtless, they were the 
product of congressional planter hegemony.  Bankers protested that the new 
laws favored agricultural interests and punished the banking system.  As banks 
could discharge the 10 percent specie tax in Treasury notes worth 4-5 cents on 
the dollar, Congress levied a tax-in-kind on their coin.  A banker was therefore 
                                                 
112
 Laws of Congress In Regard To Taxes, Currency And Conscription, Passed February 1864. 
(Richmond: James E. Goode, Senate Printer, 1864) 3-35.; Todd, Confederate Finance, 150.  
 46
required to surrender one-tenth of his money in coin.  In comparison, officers 
appraised property at its 1860 gold evaluation, unless sold after 1863.  According 
to Ball, “a farm worth $10,000 in 1860 was, at the beginning of 1864, worth 
something over $200,000 in treasury notes.  Yet its assessed tax was only $500 
in paper, worth something like $20 in coin.”113  In the months preceding the new 
act, the Richmond Examiner and other newspapers called for heavier taxation as 
the only means of restoring the devalued currency.  Had Congress omitted all 
exemptions, suspensions, and the liberal rebate system, receipts would have 
been 300 percent higher.114  
 
Memminger’s Last Report 
This was the last tax act of the Confederacy.  On May 2, Memminger, 
clearly unhappy with the new tax laws, issued a report on the Treasury’s financial 
situation.  It requested three amendments to the present tax act: “1. That which 
allows the value of the tax in kind to be deducted from the tax of five per cent. 
[sic] on agricultural property. 2. That which repeals the income tax for the present 
year on incomes derived from property taxed as capital.  3. That which 
discriminates as to the date to which assessments are to have reference.”115  He 
limited his recommendations for the sake of simplicity, but criticized other 
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aspects of the tax law.  He noted that the only revenue expected for the coming 
year was from the Tax-in-Kind: “Two kinds of taxes have been provided, those in 
money and those in kind.  The money taxes to be paid during the current year 
have been devoted by Congress almost entirely to the support of the 
currency.”116  He also pointed out the inequity between agricultural and non-
agricultural assessments.  While the Treasury assessed the former at 1860 
levels, the latter accounted for depreciation, 
     [I]n the assessment of agricultural and other property…. the latter is assessed at its 
value in Treasury notes, which are acknowledged to be depreciated at least to one-third 
their face, the former is assessed at values which prevailed when Treasury notes were 
nearly at par with specie.  This inequality creates discontent in the public mind, and 
cannot be maintained….  Doubtless it was supposed that legislation of this kind would 
reach the speculator and extortioner [sic].  But it will be found that most of these classes 
have escaped the tax by taking refuge in agricultural investments; while thousands of 
widows and orphans and loyal citizens, who have invested their all in stocks and 
securities, are deprived of their means of support.117  
 
Finally, he called attention to the $82 million dollars collected from internal 
taxation, stressing that, “the difficulties which are encountered in the collection 
can only be estimated by any one who will inspect the mass of papers which are 
required for each return, and the inquiries necessary to be made of each 
individual taxpayer.  The results of the tax will probably confirm the 
recommendation already made of a resort to a more simple system of 
taxation.”118 
 Congress adopted none of the Secretary’s recommendations.  By now he 
was a discredited figure, largely ignored.  On June 14, the last day of the 
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session, Congress repealed the tax on bank deposits—shifting it to depositors—
and allowed the specie tax to be paid in specie or Treasury notes.  However, this 
amendment came largely at the insistence of the bankers.  On June 15, 
Memminger resigned.119  
Conclusion 
Less than 4 percent of the Confederacy’s total revenue came from taxes.  
The Union, on the other hand, financed 20 percent of the war with taxes.120  The 
inadequacies in Confederate tax programs were largely the products of southern 
political ideology dating back to the Jacksonian period.  Planters, who would bear 
the heaviest burden of any tax program, were unaccustomed to taxation outside 
the state and local sphere.  Cotton planters believed they were already 
contributing their fair share by growing a staple that supplied a number of 
profitable secondary and tertiary operations.  Public opinion was strongly divided 
on the power of the government to tax individuals.  And Congress, consisting of 
40 percent planters, frustrated Memminger’s efforts to enact effective taxation.  
This is not to say Memminger was a brilliant politician and financier.  Indeed, he 
was a nebbish, with a limited ability to get others to see his point of view. He also 
shared the same unfounded optimism in the southern cause, as every other 
politician and public citizen did.  But even the most competent financier would 
have found too many factors working against him.  Had the Congress and the 
states complied with heavy taxation schemes, it would not erase other internal 
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problems such as lack of equipment, supplies, and the Union disrupting 
assessments in certain areas. 121  As Edwin R. Seligman states in The Income 
Tax (1911), “what might have happened with the Confederate income tax under 
more favorable auspices is a useless speculation.”122  
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Chapter III 
Loans 
 
“Our Treasury cannot be guided by experience, since history furnishes no 
parallel of circumstances.  It must feel its way.”123   
                                            C.G. Memminger, December 24, 1861. 
The Confederacy’s first financing measures were fitting for a nation not yet 
at war.  On February 28, 1861, the Provisional Congress adopted a measure to 
raise not more than $15 million. The government’s financial needs were 
immediate and temporary.  As war broke, and expenses mounted, the 
Confederacy sought a better means of financing.  An ambitious $100 million loan 
program passed at a period of high southern élan.  Planter zeal led to many 
generous subscriptions.  However, the blockade damaged the marketability of 
cotton, which constituted 90 percent of the produce loan.  Planters soon 
demanded that the Confederacy purchase all their cotton in Treasury notes.  A 
prohibitively expensive notion, Memminger did not oblige.  As a result, many 
planters cancelled their subscriptions, choosing instead sell their produce 
independently.  In 1863, a Confederate loan in Europe generated £1,759,894 for
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 the purchase of arms and supplies.  While historians are divided on how 
successful the “Erlanger Loan,” actually was, much of it was out of Memminger’s 
hands.   
 
Rudimentary Acts of Patriotism 
On February 9, 1861 the general assembly in Montgomery, Alabama 
approved a $500,000 Treasury note loan for use by the Southern Congress.  
When Memminger took office nine days later, his first funding request came from 
Captian Deas of DeKalb County, Georgia.  It was a requisition for blankets and 
rations for 100 men.  Without any cash on hand, Memminger went to the Central 
Bank of Alabama where he floated a loan on his own personal credit.  This act of 
patriotism on behalf of the Secretary was not the only one.  The Confederacy 
received numerous donations in 1861 including money, clothing, and food.  One 
southern woman even suggested that women donate their hair to settle the 
Confederate debt.  It was calculated that the hair could be sold abroad for $40 
million in specie. 124 
On February 28, 1861, the Provisional Congress adopted an “Act to raise 
money for the support of the Government and to provide for the defense of the 
Confederate States of America.”  The act authorized the Secretary, on consent of 
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the President, to borrow “on the credit of the Confederate States, a sum not 
exceeding fifteen millions of dollars, or so much thereof as in his opinion the 
exigencies of the public service may require… for the support of the Government 
and for the defences [sic] of the Confederate States.”125  Issue certificates were 
either stocks or bonds, and bore 8 percent interest payable semi-annually in 
specie.  After five years, and with three months public notice, the Confederacy 
could pay any portion on the bonds or stocks.  Congress levied a duty of one-
eighth of 1 percent on all raw cotton exported from the Confederacy payable in 
specie or interest coupons.  All proceeds from the duty were “specially pledged to 
the due payment of interest and principal of the loan.”  The duty would cease 
upon the loan’s cancellation.  To promote cancellation, Congress authorized a 
sinking fund to provide for the loan—which was never carried out.126 
Memminger knew that loans and paper money backed by loans were a 
poor means of financing.  Without taxation, the Confederacy would end in ruin.  
However, in 1861, the government’s financial needs were immediate and 
temporary.  There would be plenty of time for fiscal prudence when the situation 
returned to normal.127 
Memminger set out in preparation for the sale of the stocks and bonds.  
He arranged to float $5 million in bonds and obtain payment in specie.  The 
bonds were modeled after those issued by the United States Treasury and were 
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printed in denominations of one thousand dollars, five hundred dollars, one 
hundred dollars, and fifty dollars.  Memminger appointed commissioners in each 
state to encourage subscriptions, often recruiting prominent citizens and other 
leading businessmen.  He hoped that the new debt would stimulate southern 
patriotism by making citizens creditors.  In the North, he hoped that New Yorkers 
would pick up one million dollars worth, which would fare well in European 
diplomacy.  The first public announcement of the loan came on March 16, 1861.  
An advertisement printed in southern newspapers read, “Five millions of this 
most advantageous investment will be offered to the public on April 17th ensuing, 
and every citizen throughout the Confederate States will have the opportunity of 
taking a share of the benefit, and at the same time of sustaining the cause of the 
country.”128  The stipulations of the investment called for 5 percent payment in 
specie at the time of subscription, and the remaining 95 percent in specie on or 
before May 1, 1861.129 
The bond was successful, despite some problems.  Commissioners 
assured subscribers that the duty on exports provided enough revenue to meet 
interest on the loan, and an additional one million dollars per year was added to 
the sinking fund.  Commissioners subscribed over $5 million in one day.  
However, a suspension of specie payments by many southern banks in early 
1861 obstructed easy access to specie.  Soon investors found they could not 
acquire enough coin to pay the initial subscription costs.  The Treasury could not 
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accept payment in banknotes at face value as several state banks were 
insolvent.  Luckily, the initial success of the loan caused a reversal in coin 
suspension.  In early April, Charleston banks agreed to redeem in specie their 
outstanding banknotes, and other banks followed suit.130 
 
The Loan and the Planters 
Following the hostilities at Fort Sumter, Memminger asked Davis to 
authorize the remaining $10 million for subscription given the “present aspect of 
our relations [with the North].”  Davis agreed, and on April 22, 1861, the Treasury 
informed commissioners to subscribe the full amount.  Thus far, the loan was a 
great success, receiving an enthusiastic response from the banking community in 
Savannah, New Orleans, and Charleston.  On May 7, Memminger wrote to the 
Commissioners of the Loan to thank them for their “zealous and effective 
services.”  However, there was work to be done.  The loan had not yet reached 
the planters.  Memminger stated:  
     The commercial community and the banks have already responded with patriotic 
alacrity; but they have means and loyalty which will doubtless respond again.  The 
planting community are further removed from the centres [sic] of trade, and have not yet 
been reached.  Permit me to suggest an effort on your part to bring the subject distinctly 
before them…. Few among them realize that a State Treasury, like their own rivers, will 
over flow by multiplying drops. 131   
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Yet the primary factor in the lack of planter investments was money.  
Commissioners J.W. Garrot and James L. Price wrote the Secretary some days 
before stating, “Many of our planters of large means are not only willing but 
anxious to aid their country by taking the proposed loan, but for want of money, 
they find it utterly impossible to do so….  We fear that we shall not be able to 
dispose of much more stock, unless the terms are in some way modified or 
relaxed.”  Memminger, however, saw no need to modify subscription plans, and 
instead placed greater emphasis on commercial and banking interests.  The 
entrance of Virginia, Tennessee, and North Carolina into the Confederacy aided 
his strategy.132   
Memminger’s First Report 
 Memminger’s first Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on May 10, 
1861 outlined a total deficit of $38,001,050 by the end of the year.  He called on 
Congress to provide the Treasury with $13,152,503 by October 1, and an 
additional $24,838,547 by the end of December.  Even this sum, he believed, “in 
all probability, [would] be increased by the increased dimensions which the war is 
assuming; so that the provision to be made should be full.”133  Up to May 1, 
Confederate revenues consisted almost exclusively of funds seized from United 
States mints and customs houses in the South, equaling just over $1 million 
dollars.  Memminger expected no assistance from the duties collected up to 
October 1 as, “imports and exports are limited at the Southern ports to the period 
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at which the crop begins to move forward.”134  Therefore, he called for other 
sources of revenue in loans and taxes.  Memminger requested a war tax not 
exceeding $15 million, an issue of Treasury notes not exceeding $20 million, and 
an import tariff at 12 ½ percent.  Making provisions for the lack of money among 
planters, Memminger also called for a $50 million loan at 8 percent interest “to 
accept from citizens who may tender any resources which can be made available 
as a means of credit, upon such terms as he shall deem for the public interest”135 
 On May 16, 1861, Congress passed legislation providing $50 million in 20-
year 8 percent bonds.  The legislation stated that the bonds were for “specie, 
military stores, or for the proceeds of sales of raw produce or manufactured 
articles to be paid in the form of specie or with foreign bills of exchange.” 
Congress authorized for immediate use $20 million in bonds, issued in non-
interest bearing Treasury notes, accepted for all taxes save the export duty on 
cotton.136 
Generating Planter Interest 
 While the $15 million loan was brought mostly to the attention of the 
bankers, the $50 million loan was directed more to the planters and farmers.  
Most citizens in the Confederacy had no available money, but plenty of 
provisions the Treasury could use in lieu of money.  At once, the Treasury issued 
subscription lists in rural areas, on which every planter could indicate the portion 
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of his crop he wished to lend the government. Two different lists were prepared: 
the first for cotton and tobacco, the second for provisions and military stores.  
Memminger beseeched his staff that “no disturbance shall be made of the usual 
arrangement of each planter for selling his crop; but that he shall simply indicate 
the portion he is willing to subscribe, the time and place of delivery, and the 
factor in whose hands it is placed for sale.”137 
 Commissioners received an enthusiastic response from planters.  
Subscriptions ranged from one-quarter to the whole of a crop.  In some 
instances, planters asked for their subscriptions to remain in effect annually until 
the end of the war.  Memminger was pleased.   In a letter to John A. Jordan, the 
Secretary wrote, “The Government is cheered by similar reports from every 
quarter and the people seem to be vying with each other in a noble rivalry of 
patriotic zeal.”  President Davis, too, expressed his pleasure with subscriptions in 
an address to the Provisional Congress, “In the single article of cotton, the 
subscriptions to the loan proposed by the Government cannot fall short of fifty 
millions of dollars, and will probably exceed that amount; and scarcely an article 
required for the consumption of the Army is provided otherwise than by 
subscription to the produce loan…”138 
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An Updated Scheme 
Owing to its success, Congress updated this scheme on August 19, 1861 
with a $100 million loan—also known as the “Produce Loan.”  Again, this loan 
was aimed at the planters.  The bonds bore 8 percent interest and were due in 
20 years.  Memminger wanted 50 percent of subscriptions in produce—
essentially planters turning over their food and cotton to the government.  The 
other half was allocated for subscription in Treasury notes or banknotes.  As a 
financial strategy, the reason for securing half the loan in produce was to secure 
agricultural supplies without the use of the currency.139   
Planting Interests 
There were several problems with the new loan.  If the blockade 
continued, the value of cotton would lessen.  Some planters believed that the 
Government might withhold payment until the blockade afforded them a 
favorable price.  The Secretary received numerous complaints regarding fixed 
sale dates and forced sales.  Memminger attempted to lessen these fears.  In a 
letter to General W.W. Harllee, which he suggested for general circulation, he 
stated:  
     If the blockade be not broken, the crop will remain unsold and neither the owner nor 
the Government will realize any proceeds of sale until that difficulty be removed.  If this 
difficulty should remain permanent, or if there should be reasonable ground to 
apprehend the continuance of the blockade, it will become proper to adopt some other 
scheme of finance providing for that contingency.140 
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Cotton planters also pressed the Government to purchase all their cotton.  
This, it was reasoned, would accomplish one of two things: that the Confederacy 
use the cotton as a basis for the value of bonds or currency; or that Confederacy 
could send it abroad before the blockade closed too tightly.  With the 
Government purchasing all of the South’s cotton, it would give planters a market 
and money with which they could settle taxes and other debts.  Alexander 
Stephens, Judah P. Benjamin, Joseph E. Johnson, and other civil and military 
leaders strongly suggested the Confederacy ship the cotton abroad and steadily 
increase its price.  They believed the entire war could be funded this way, while 
providing relief for the planters.141 
Secretary Memminger saw otherwise.  In a letter to the commissioners 
penned October 15, 1861, he addressed two common enquiries: whether the 
Government would continue with subscriptions as the blockade tightened; and 
whether the Government would authorize promises of aid to the planters as a 
means of producing more subscriptions.  Memminger believed that subscriptions 
should continue through the blockade as they “are quite as valuable to the 
Government during the blockade, as after it.”  He dismissed the notion that the 
Government had physical control of the produce itself, clarifying that:  
     The subscription is confined to the proceeds of sales, and contains an order on the 
commission merchant, or factor of the planter, to pay over to the Treasurer the amount 
subscribed, in exchange for Confederate Bonds.  The transaction is simply an 
agreement by the planter to lend the Government so much money; and, in order to 
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complete the transaction, a time and place are appointed when and where the parties 
may meet to carry it out. 142 
 
As far as Memminger was concerned, it was not so important when 
subscriptions were carried out.  It was assumed they would be carried out at 
some time, “Whether that time be December or June is simply a question of 
convenience, and works no injury to either party.  The Government is sure of the 
eventual payment, and derives from that certainty so much credit; and it loses 
nothing, because it gives its bond only when the money is paid.”143  As to 
whether the Government would authorize promises of aid to the planters as a 
means of producing more subscriptions, Memminger’s answer was simple, “No 
power is granted to any Department to lend money for the relief of any interest.” 
Memminger was open to any alterations in the Provisional Constitution that 
would provide aid in the future, if “the financial necessities of the country demand 
the change.”144   
Chastising Planter Dominance 
The Secretary’s letter addressed two other notions: that the Government 
should purchase the South’s entire cotton crop; and that the Government should 
advance income on behalf of the value of cotton.  Placing transportation and 
management issues aside, Memminger estimated the entire value of the cotton 
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crop at $200 million.  Subtracting subscriptions at $50 million, and adding to the 
amount other agricultural products “which would certainly claim the same 
benefit,” the amount totaled approximately $175 million.  As for an advance, he 
estimated that at a price of less than 5 cents per pound, an advance would equal 
$100 million.  By taking even the least objectionable sum—which, if found 
disagreeable, would negate the larger sum—it would require $100 million in 
Treasury notes “distributed among the planting community upon the pledge of 
the forthcoming crop.”  Memminger chastised the arrogance of the planting 
community: 
     The first remarkable feature in this scheme is, that it proposes that a new 
Government, yet struggling for existence, should reject all the lessons of experience, 
and undertake that which no Government, however long established, has yet succeeded 
in effecting.  The “organization of labor” has called forth many ingenious attempts, both 
speculative and practical, among well-established Governments, but always with 
disastrous failure.  With us, however, the experiment is proposed to a new Government, 
which is engaged in a gigantic war, and which must rely on credit to furnish means to 
carry on that war.  Our enemies are in possession of all the munitions and work-shops 
which have been collected during forty-five years of peace—their fleets have been built 
up at our joint expense.  With all these on hand, they yet are obliged to expend nearly 
ten millions of dollars per week to carry on the war.  Can we expect to contend with them 
at less than half that expenditure?  Supposing that it may require 200 millions of dollars; 
then the proposal is, that, at a time when we are called upon to raise this large sum for 
the support of the Government, we shall raise a further sum of 100 millions, for the 
benefit of the planting interest [Emphasis added]. 145   
Indeed, the planting interests demanded too much from the Government.  The 
same citizens who were unwilling to alter their lifestyle to preserve the 
Confederacy were asking special favors of it.  Memminger saw no need for 
Government intervention in private interests, especially those of a privileged 
group.  Referring to them as “so intelligent a class,” he believed that if they 
banded together to secure their own subsistence, relief would come.  The 
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Government needed every Treasury note it could get.  Supporting planters by an 
increase in Treasury notes would “hazard [the] entire credit and stability” of the 
Government.146  
 In respect to payment in Treasury notes, the Confederacy purchased the 
bulk of its cotton with bonds.  Indeed, bonds were used for the purchase of food, 
arms, and transportation costs.  Motivated by a desire to borrow money in 
Europe, Memminger earlier recommended that Congress accept articles from the 
Produce loan in exchange for bonds, in part to utilize foreign aid to lift the 
blockade, and in part to silence the planters’ demands in purchasing the entire 
cotton crop.147   
A Full Subscription 
By November 25, 1861, the $15 million loan had been completed.  
Memminger thanked the commissioners for their service, and requested their 
continued diligence in acquiring subscriptions.  The Secretary noted that the loan 
relied completely on the patriotism and resources of the people.   
As for the $100 million loan, it met with some success by the end of 1861.  
According to historian J.C. Schwab, “Over 400,000 bales of cotton had been 
offered, 1000 hogsheads of tobacco, 5000 bushels of wheat, 270,000 bushels of 
rice, 1000 hogsheads of sugar and molasses, and about $1,000,000 worth of 
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other produce; also $1,000,000 in money, that is, in treasury notes or 
banknotes.”148  Cotton accounted for nine tenths of the total subscription.  In all, 
bonds accounted for $31 million or 22 percent of total receipts in 1861. 149 
 
Collections/Problems 
At the beginning of 1862, the Produce loan office had not yet received any 
proceeds from subscriptions.  As there were frequent reports and rumors that 
planters were selling their already subscribed produce, the Government worked 
frantically to carry out nationwide collections.  In January, J.D.B. DeBow, Chief 
Commissioner of the Produce loan, reported that collections were ready to begin.  
Whereas Memminger initially settled on a volunteer subscription and collection 
program to reduce corruption, there were so many areas left unsolicited that he 
agreed to a commission: $1,000 on the first $100,000 collected, up to a 
maximum of $4,000.150   
Changes 
On March 14, 1862, Memminger issued a report calling for several 
changes to the Produce Loan, as the initial terms were confusing.  Many planters 
assumed that cash or bonds were imminent—not “confined to the proceeds of 
sales.”  As such, more and more planters cancelled their subscriptions, choosing 
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instead sell their produce independently.151  To alleviate this, the Secretary 
recommended that produce subscriptions “be taken for this loan of all articles … 
[and] exchanged for…bonds.”  He also asked, “That cotton and tobacco, and 
other agricultural products subscribed to the produce loan… be accepted at a 
valuation in exchange for the bonds to such extent and under such regulations as 
my be determined by Congress—the Secretary of the Treasury to have authority 
to ship, or sell, or procure advances upon such produce for the use of the 
government.”152  Memminger believed this scheme was more in tune with the 
“wants of the community.”  He wrote, “The planting community will more readily 
be induced to take bonds which they can use in payment, or which will be paid 
up at short periods, and which from the small amount of money-capital usually 
seeking investment in bonds, they can expect to realize promptly by the usual 
method of sale.”  More and more, it was Memminger accommodating the planting 
interests, but he had little choice.  Patriotism was not enough of an inducement 
for planters to sell.153   
Memminger’s report also called for an increase in bonds, amounting to 
$164 million.  He estimated Government expenses for the following nine months 
at $215 million.  To raise this amount, he counted on $18 million still available in 
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bonds, and $20 million from taxes.  He proposed to raise the remaining $176 
million through new bonds and taxes.154 
On April 18, 1862, Congress extended the amount of bonds, stocks, and 
Treasury notes issued to $250 million.  Three days later, Congress passed a law 
allocating $35 million for planters to exchange their goods for 8 percent bonds.  
Under the law, the Secretary could “issue PRODUCE CERTIFICATES, which 
shall entitle the party to whom issued, or his endorsee, to receive the produce 
therein set forth, and to ship the same to any neutral port, in conformity with the 
laws of the Confederate States.”155 
More Problems 
The new detailed regulations were issued to agents on May 21, 1862.  
Agents were directed to purchase cotton almost exclusively with bonds (as much 
as they could get).  Planters had the option to settle their subscriptions in kind or 
in Treasury notes.  In return, they would receive either bonds or certificates of 
stock.  As it was difficult for planters to ship their cotton through the blockade, 
they were more than willing to exchange it.156   
As per usual, agents received several complaints in regards to the new 
loan.  Some planters complained of a price inequity in different states.  DeBow, 
who was now a General Agent for subscriptions in New Orleans, stated: 
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     The market price of cotton is determined by the competition of private buyers and 
where these are willing to give 12, 15 or 17 cents it has not been found that parties are 
inclined to accept a lower figure from the Government.  This competition is again 
determined by the relative safety of the article from the torch and the enemy, and whilst 
capital is willing to bid 15 and 17 cents in the heart of South Carolina, Georgia, and 
Alabama, it has not approached those figures in sections further to the West.157 
Other planters refused to sell entirely, unless part of the transaction occurred in 
negotiable Treasury notes.  Memminger informed his agents, “You are instructed 
to make your purchases with Bonds as far as practicable and whenever parties 
selling refuse to receive payment entirely in Bonds you are authorized to make 
payment in cash not to exceed in any case more than one-half of the whole 
cost”158 
On January 9, 1863, Archibald Roane, Principal Clerk of the Produce 
Loan Office, gave a report on the whole amount of Produce Loan subscriptions—
most occurring in 1861.  The Treasury procured 431,347 bales of cotton totaling 
$21,567,350.  Added to cash and miscellaneous items at $1,503,555, the amount 
totaled $23,070,905.159  This was a far cry from the $50 million expected.  In a 
report on October 2, 1862, Memminger admitted that the Produce Loan was a 
failure.  It was both slow in collecting produce and unsuccessful as a means of 
converting currency into bonds.  Much of it was out of Memminger’s hands.  
Agents could not draw the support of the people through most of 1862.  
Moreover, they had made only moderate progress in collecting the earliest 
subscriptions.160 
                                                 
157
 Ibid., 43. 
158
 Ibid., 44. 
159
 Ibid. 46.   
160
 Smith, “The History of the Confederate Treasury,” 104.  
 67
Exhausting Credit Abroad 
At the beginning of the war the Confederacy employed several 
contractors, purchasing agents, and blockade-runners who secured armaments 
and supplies in Europe.  By the fall of 1862, the Confederacy had exhausted their 
credit abroad and failed at securing European intervention.  The Confederacy 
hoped to stem the tide by raising new funds and reestablishing credit 
overseas.161   
Exchanging bonds for produce had put no real money into the Treasury.  
Many viewed the Government’s massive supply of cotton from the Produce Loan 
as a “white elephant.”  However, as blockade runners began shipping cargoes of 
cotton to Nassau en route to England, the Treasury saw an opportunity for using 
the staple as a basis for credit.162 
At the beginning of 1862, Memminger instructed his collection agents to 
see if any merchants in their districts could secure a credit in England sustained 
on the basis of cotton.  Memminger had floated the idea of using cotton as a 
basis for credit as early as May 1, 1861.  His plan was to pledge cotton to English 
banking houses, promising shipment upon removal of the blockade.  On learning 
of the Secretary’s desires, the Richmond Examiner ran a favorable piece on the 
idea of using cotton for credit in Europe, “If a million bales of cotton could be 
offered at a fair price, to meet the demand in France, that Government would 
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purchase it on delivery in this country.  This would necessitate the Emperor to 
raise the blockade and take possession of the purchase….”163 
A rumor that the Confederacy was considering cotton bonds reached 
France and England around the time they exhausted their oversupply from 1860.  
By 1862, the demand for cotton in Europe was so large that it was selling for 25 
pence or 50 cents per pound.  Consider that in January 1863, cotton in 
Richmond was selling between 16 and 22 cents per pound.  Any eagerness by 
the Confederacy to obtain cotton-based credit overseas was equally matched by 
European demand. 164   
At first, the Treasury issued 1,500 Cotton Certificates for use in Europe, 
each valued at $1000.  James M. Mason, Commissioner to Great Britain, 
determined that the price of cotton be fixed at 5 pence sterling.  The certificates 
were “demandable only after peace, and within six months thereafter,” as it was 
“impossible to deliver cotton in any great amount till then.”  The Government also 
agreed to transport the cotton at any time during the war with the bondholder 
assuming the cost of transportation.  Memminger believed Cotton Certificates 
were the best means of raising funds abroad.  On November 7, 1862, 
Memminger wrote to the Secretary of the Navy, S.R. Mallory stating: 
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     The embarrassment which my agents meet with is from being obliged to purchase 
with bonds.  This difficulty could be removed by your placing at my disposal the money 
which you wish to remit to Europe.  With that my agents would buy cotton, and upon 
these purchases, Cotton Certificates could be issued and sent to Europe, and their 
proceeds placed to the credit of your agent in Europe.165 
However, a serious blunder arose when the War Department used its own 
agents to expedite cotton purchases.  Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin, too, 
pledged cotton as a means of collateral.  On January 17, 1862, Benjamin wrote 
E. J. Forestall of New Orleans, a representative of a foreign banking house, 
asking for one million dollars for deposit in England.  In addition to the payment 
of interest and commission, the War Department would “place in the hands of the 
agent of such house on this side such number of bales of cotton as might be 
agreed to be sufficient to cover the advance.”166  Over time, war agents began 
competing with produce loan agents which increased prices and encouraged 
planters to hold out for the best deal.167  
 
The Erlanger Loan 
  The Confederacy did manage one substantial loan in Europe.  In March 
1863, they floated a £3 million loan with the French Banking house Emile 
Erlanger and Company of Paris.  Known as the “Erlanger Loan,” it was the only 
foreign loan floated during the Civil War.168   
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 Several European banking-houses proposed offers, the largest one 
coming from Emile Erlanger and Company of Paris.  On October 28, 1862, John 
Slidell, representative of the Confederacy in France, wrote Benjamin discussing 
the terms of the Erlanger loan.  The Confederacy was to sell £5 million 8 percent 
bonds to Messrs. Emile Erlanger & Co. at seventy pounds per each hundred 
pound nominal bond (70 percent).   
That Benjamin handled negotiations instead of Memminger was not due to 
any incompetence on part of the Secretary, but that Benjamin spoke fluent 
French, and was a shrewd negotiator.  Memminger would receive the terms of 
the contract and add his own modifications; however, much of the diplomacy was 
out of his hands.169  
 The Confederacy found the initial terms of the loan unsatisfactory.  On 
January 15, 1863, Benjamin wrote Slidell stating his dissatisfaction:  
     A loan at 70 per cent, with an allowance of 5 per cent commission, and a discount on 
the deferred payments at the rate of 8 per cent per annum, was found to leave a net 
result of about 61 per cent.  To pay the capital on demand at 6 pence per pound would 
therefore in reality have resulted in selling cotton at that rate with a deduction of 39 per 
cent.  In other words, we would have obtained for each pound of cotton 61 per cent on 6 
pence, or about 3 ⅔ pence per pound…. This was so much lower than other offers, and 
would have required such an enormous quantity of cotton to pay the $25,000,000 of 
nominal capital… that it was impossible to accept the proposals.170 
 
However, Slidell believed the proposal had other benefits.  A foreign loan had 
political advantages.  On October 28, 1862, Slidell met with Napoleon III 
petitioning for French recognition of the Confederacy.  He portrayed the 
Confederacy as, “a thoroughly united people, ready and willing to make every 
sacrifice and submit of every privation for the establishment of their 
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independence.”171  The Emperor’s sympathies were with the Confederacy— he 
was particularly impressed with Major General Stuart’s cavalry march into 
Pennsylvania.  However, any action without England’s consent would drive them 
to side with the United States.  Slidell wrote, “The condition of affairs in Europe 
[were] very unsatisfactory, especially in Italy and Greece; that if he [Napoleon III] 
acted alone, England, instead of following his example, would endeavor to 
embroil with the United States and that French commerce would be 
destroyed.”172  Yet monetary recognition could prove as powerful as diplomatic 
recognition, and the Erlanger loan was a strong endorsement of Sothern 
nationalism.  Erlanger himself was sympathetic to the Southern cause—he would 
eventually marry Slidell’s daughter.  Indeed, a financial interest independent of 
Britain might engender French political recognition.173   
 Benjamin was cautious.  From an economic standpoint, the loan was poor 
financing.  Politically, however, he too saw an advantage.  In Benjamin’s words, 
“The profits by the takers of this loan will be enormous and when you become 
aware of the condition of things on this side you will be convinced that they are 
quite sufficient to effect the political purposes you anticipate.”174 
 After much bargaining, Emile Erlanger and Company agreed on the final 
terms of the loan.  They were better than anticipated.  Erlanger and Company 
would float a twenty-year loan of £3 million in Europe.  Erlanger and Co. would 
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pay 72 percent of the loan’s face value to the Confederacy (£2,160,000) on 
September 23, 1863.  The Confederate bonds paid 7 percent interest 
semiannually with an offering price 10 percent below face value—equaling an 8 
percent yield.  In addition, there were semi-annual drawing on the bonds that 
paid investors one-fortieth of the principal.  The bonds were backed by New 
Orleans middling cotton at a price of six pence per pound.  At the time, the going 
rate for cotton in England was over twenty pence per pound.  Memminger 
understood that keeping cotton at six pence would prevent purchasers from 
buying directly from the Confederacy at domestic prices.  The Confederacy 
promised to deliver the cotton within ten miles of a railway station or navigable 
waterway in the South.   
The deal weighed in favor of Erlanger and Co., which can be attributed to 
a number of factors.  Firstly, In seeking European loans, the Confederacy had to 
choose among what was offered.  It was not in current practice to “shop-around” 
for a better deal.175  Second, given European financial practices of the 1860s, the 
Confederacy would have received similar offers from other houses.  Those that 
specialized in high-risk undertakings demanded proportional compensation.  
Third, European creditors were still mindful of Davis’s credit repudiation.  As late 
as 1859, a standard European investment guide stated “The name of Mississippi 
is a byword and reproach upon American state credit.”176  And at least Erlanger 
and Co. were upfront about the tremendous profit they stood to make.  Other 
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houses cheated them surreptitiously.  For example, Isaac, Campbell and 
Company, who supplied the Confederacy with armaments and other war 
materials, kept a double set of books, quoting the real price of goods sold and 
the price charged to the Confederacy.  As described by Owsley, “the firm only 
chuckled and observed that that was their only chance of insuring themselves 
against loss.”177 
 The Erlanger loan was initially successful. Subscriptions opened March 
18, 1863 in London, Liverpool, Amsterdam, Paris, and Frankfurt, with the bonds 
priced at 90 percent their face value.  In three days, the bonds were five times 
oversubscribed and the loan quoted between 92 ¾ and 95.  Yet early successes 
were short-lived.  By March 23, the price fell below 90.  Though Erlanger and Co. 
attempted to stabilize the bond by buying more, they ran out of capital by April 5.  
The Confederacy authorized Erlanger and Co. to purchase bonds on their 
account, and as such, the Confederacy had to buy back over half their issue by 
May 14.  Afterwards, prices remained relatively stable, until news from 
Gettysburg and Vicksburg saw the bond fall to 60.  From here, bond prices 
fluctuated with the news from the front.  Recurring rumors of the fall of 
Charleston drove prices down, while recurring rumors of blockade repulsion 
drove prices upward.  In December 1863, the battle of Chattanooga temporarily 
pushed bond prices to 37—their lowest point until 1865.  
 Such was the speculative nature of the bonds that they did not rely on 
cotton prices abroad.  The Federal blockade so hindered the supply of cotton that 
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could reach Europe that it was uncertain whether the Confederacy could deliver if 
the bonds were redeemed.    As such, prices rose and fell with war news—
dubious or not.  Rumors of Confederate victory, an armistice with the Union, or a 
successful cotton shipment through the blockade saw prices rise throughout a 
good portion of 1864.178 
The net cash income from the Erlanger loan equaled £1,759,894.  Though 
the initial loan was for £3 million, a 90 percent bond minus Erlanger’s profits and 
commission of £546,371 equaled a total possible net income of just £2,153,629.  
Investors considered the Erlanger loan a good investment until 1865, when it was 
obvious that the Confederacy would lose the war.  A bond for £1,000 that 
promised forty thousand pounds of cotton worth £4,000 was attractive in spite of 
the blockade—especially given the demand for cotton in Europe.  Though 
historians are divided on how successful the bond actually was, to its credit, it 
provided the Confederacy with much needed capital to purchase war supplies. 179 
 
Conclusion 
The Confederacy purchased almost no cotton in 1864-1865.  Planters had 
no desire to sell to a declining state when they could speculate for greater gain 
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on the open market.180  The Confederacy did sell a substantial amount of bonds; 
however, these sales were due to the inflated state of the currency and a lack of 
alternative investment.  The Produce Loan, in its original conception, failed 
because it required the sales of produce in exchange for bonds.  With the 
Confederate coasts blockaded, there was no market.  Appeasing the planting 
interests by purchasing all their cotton in Treasury notes was prohibitively 
expensive, and therefore fiscally unsound.  However, this aroused the ire of the 
planters, who in turn sold their produce independently on a more favorable 
market. Agents could not draw the support of the people through most of 1862.  
By this point, the Confederacy had begun its precipitous financial decline. 
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Chapter IV 
 
Treasury Notes 
 
 
 
 “The fact is… that this paper [money]… represents zero every place in 
the world except in the Confederate States where it is imposed, and that if the 
North ever arrives at its ends, everyone will be almost literally ruined in the 
South”181  
           Alfred Paul, French Consul at Richmond, December 8, 1861.  
 
Given the massive expenditures of the Confederacy, coupled with 
inadequate revenue from taxes and loans, paper currency became the only 
viable option.  The Confederate Treasury issued over seventy different types of 
notes during the war, totaling $1.5 billion—an incomprehensible sum in its day.  
Added to this were Treasury notes issued by state and county governments, 
banks, insurance companies, textile mills, and other businesses.  This over-
saturation of Treasury bills caused such an appalling rate of inflation that the 
citizenry suffered.  For example, in North Carolina, between 1862 and 1865, the 
price of wheat rose 1700 percent, bacon rose 2500 percent, and flour almost 
2800 percent.  By 1865 a pair of shoes cost $600.  Memminger warned 
Congress on several occasions of the danger in funding a nation with Treasury
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 notes.  But the fiscal burdens of the Confederacy left the Secretary with little 
choice.182 
 
 
Confederate Banking System 
 
The Confederacy did not have a national banking system of its own and 
made no serious attempt to introduce one.  Their credit was insufficient, and 
most southerners had long been opposed to a national bank.  Each Confederate 
state, though loyal to the southern cause, guarded its own financial interests 
closely.  The Confederate Constitution stated that, “No state shall… make 
anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts….”183  However, 
as neither the central government nor the state banks had adequate gold and 
silver for minting coins, they ignored this restriction.184  Furthermore, the 
Confederacy issued no provision to make paper currency legal tender.  All paper 
currencies were either promissory notes or interest-bearing notes backed by the 
faith of the people.  The value of paper currency rose and fell precipitously on 
war news, rumors, financial news, and the like.    
Before 1861, New York had been the nation’s banking center.  On April 
24, 1861, southern funds deposited in New York banks were seized by order of 
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the Federal Government.  Count E. de Méjan, a French Consul and Confederate 
sympathizer in New Orleans reported on the incident: 
     The activity of the banks has almost ceased; the funds which are deposited in the 
New York banks were in fact seized on the 24th of this month by order of the Federal 
government, but released at the suggestion of influential financiers who have interests 
here either in capital or in real property, and who feared, not without reason, that this 
seizure made in the North would be followed by an analogous seizure in the South….185 
 
However, even this return of funds left the South short of specie.  Estimates vary 
on how much specie the South actually held.  Schwab claims the South held $26 
million in coin, while Ball claims the South held just $8.65 million.  Regardless, 
they utilized neither figure to the fullest.  The Confederate Government used $1.6 
million in coin for business expenses in 1861.  They used an additional $1.6 
million to pay down the public debt before a specie suspension in September 
1862.  Though Memminger often warned of the dangers of inflation, this lack of 
specie hampered the Confederacy’s ability to keep inflation down.186 
 
State Currencies 
 
Here is the breakdown of state currencies during the war: On February 9, 
1861, before the Confederate Government launched its paper money policy, 
Alabama issued $1 million in State treasury notes.  The following year this 
amount was raised to $3.5 million.  Florida’s banknote issue was in excess of 
$100,000 at the beginning of 1861.  By the end of the year, the state legislature 
issued $1 million in treasury notes, and in 1862, a further issue of $300,000.  
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Georgia delayed action until 1862 when it issued $1 million in a wide variety of 
denominations.  After that, the state ordered an indefinite issue of treasury notes 
to meet its expenses.  By the fall of 1864, $18 million in treasury notes were 
outstanding—all redeemable for Confederate treasury notes.  In Louisiana, 
before the capture of New Orleans, the state had $7 million in notes outstanding.  
Mississippi authorized $1 million in treasury notes in January, 1861, and a $5 
million issue by year’s end.  The state exhausted this issue by paying out 
planters who asked for advances.  There was a further issue of $2.5 million in 
1862, and $2 million in 1864.  In North Carolina, the state began with $3.25 
million in notes, issuing $1.8 million additional notes in September, 1861, and $3 
million in December.  The following year, the State treasury issued $4.4 million in 
large and small treasury notes.  In 1863, the treasury issued $400,000, and in 
1864, $3 million.  By the end of the war, the State treasurer calculated that $8.5 
million in treasury notes were issued during the last four years.  Finally, in 
Virginia, the state began with $1 million in large denominations, increased to $4 
million in June 1861, and totally replaced by non-interest bearing treasury notes 
in December.  In March, 1862, $1.3 million were issued.  After that, both houses 
failed any further attempts to increase State treasury notes.  Coupled with state 
issued notes were those issued by individual cities, businesses, corporations, 
merchants, saloon keepers, butchers, bakers, and every other conceivable 
enterprise—including private citizens. 187   
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Immediate Cash 
 
 Even a good program of blockade-running, taxes, and loan financing 
required some use of Treasury notes to meet immediate and residual expenses.  
Though the Provisional Congress attempted to finance the new nation early 
through the $15 million loan on February 28, 1861, it put no immediate cash in 
Memminger’s hand.  On March 9, Congress authorized a $1 million issue of one-
year 3.65 percent Treasury notes in denominations no less than $50.  A contract 
was made with the National Bank Note Company of New York and on April 2, 
1861, 607 sheets of Treasury notes arrived in Montgomery.  These notes acted 
more like bonds, as they had to be endorsed each time they were passed 
around.  Their circulation was small.  Half of the notes issued were in 
denominations of $500 and $1000, and would be exchanged for smaller notes or 
used as collateral.  Memminger believed there were too many $1000 notes and 
not enough $50 and $100 notes.  He stated, “Our calls will be for the smaller 
issues”.188  
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   However, when war broke, U.S. authorities seized the plates used for 
printing Confederate Treasury notes.  Memminger turned to printers in the South, 
looking for those who could most accurately recreate the notes printed by the 
National Bank Note Company.  Memminger instructed George B. Clitherall of 
Mobile to proceed to New Orleans, where he, upon thorough investigation, 
entered into a contract with S. Schmidt on May 13, 1861.  On May 16, the 
Treasury asked Schmidt to engrave and print $20 million in Treasury notes.  In 
the meantime, Memminger wrote various banking institutions for a temporary 
loan of their bank notes.   On June 3, 1861, a bankers’ convention in Atlanta 
approved a loan of their own issue until the Treasury procured its own notes. 189   
 Schmidt, working alongside his young son and one other man, could not 
produce enough engraved notes to satisfy the Treasury.  In fact, for the first two 
months of Schmidt’s contract, he produced nothing at all.  Memminger sent 
agents throughout the nation, and to England, to acquire skilled workmen, 
materials, and machinery.  He gave 10,000 sheets of bank-note paper to the 
New Orleans lithographic establishment of J. Manouvrier.  However, lithographs 
were inferior in quality and easy to counterfeit.  Memminger wanted all 
lithographs withdrawn as soon as engraved notes entered circulation.190 
 Such was the experience with printing in the early days of the South.  The 
Confederacy had no printing establishments comparable to the North, and their 
resources were meager.  Many printers and binders left their workplaces for the 
army, and there was a shortage of paper, ink, plates, lithograph stones, and 
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presses.  Memminger had to lend printers money, recruit their workers, and 
acquire their supplies. In November, 1861, Memminger reported that on October 
24, the supply of Treasury notes had fallen behind demand by almost $12 million; 
“The daily requisitions continued to exceed the supply by nearly fifty per cent., 
and the difficulty, therefore, became greater every day.”191  By July 1863, 
Memminger expanded his note signing bureau from seventy-two employees to 
262.  Still, they struggled to produce enough paper currency.192 
 
 
Mounting Government Expenses 
 
 The Treasury’s request for $20 million in Treasury notes on May 16, 1861 
was their first issue of non-interest bearing notes.  They were issued in 
denominations not less that $5 and exchangeable at par for 10-year 8 percent 
bonds.  A popular issue, by November they Treasury distributed over $17 million 
of these notes in spite of printing shortages.193  
After the Battle of Manassas in July, 1861, Memminger advised Congress 
that the inflated dimensions of the war required new and immediate funding, “The 
fact that so much of the first Loan remains undisposed proves that Bonds cannot 
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be relied on as a resource immediately available.”194  Memminger allayed fears 
of inflation stating,  
     The apprehension of danger to the currency does not appear to be well founded.  
Taking an average of six years, up to 1858, the circulation and deposits in the banks of 
the eight Confederate States where banks exist was about eighty-five millions, with 
eighteen and a half millions of coin.  It would be not unreasonable, therefore, to assume 
that at present a circulation could be sustained of one hundred millions….195 
 
On this recommendation, Congress authorized an issue of $100 million in 
Treasury notes on August, 19, 1861.  The passage came on the same day as the 
$100 million loan.  It was believed that these bonds would guard against 
redundancy as people would convert their money into bonds at a higher rate of 
interest. 
 On December 24, 1861, Congress authorized a further issue of $50 million 
in Treasury notes, bringing the total to $150 million.  In the words of 
Memminger’s biographer, “as the exigencies of the war increased the issue of 
treasury notes were rendered necessary.”  To prevent redundancy, Congress 
authorized $30 million in 20-year 6 percent Call Certificates, with contained semi-
annual interest payments, available for purchase in money.196    
 By the end 1861, the issue of Treasury notes bordered on $125 million.  
To put this in perspective, on January 1, 1859, the aggregate of notes in 
Southern banks equaled $60 million. Note depreciation began early.  In the first 
few months of the Confederacy, paper money was at par with gold.  By August, it 
was at an 8 percent discount.  By November, it was at a 15 percent discount.  
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The following February, a 25 percent discount.  On July 19, 1861, 10 percent of 
the total Confederate debt represented Treasury notes.  By November 16, 1861, 
it was over 63 percent.  There was little Memminger could do to alleviate the 
situation.  Loan and tariff receipts were insufficient and there was no tax revenue.  
Total expenses for the fiscal year ending February 18, 1862 equaled 
$165,490,573.91.  Of this, $105,603,795.49, or 76 percent was settled with 
Treasury notes.197  
 
Notes as Legal Tender 
 
 Early on, the Provisional Congress raised the question of making Treasury 
notes legal tender.  On May 11,1861, James D. Denègre, President of the 
Citizens’ Bank of New Orleans, wrote to Memminger urging that Treasury notes 
not become legal tender.  In his words, “It would be worse than the evils of war, 
and would destroy our banks and demoralize the community.”  On July 8, E.J. 
Forstall, in a long letter to Duncan F. Kenner, chairman of the Ways and Means 
Committee, wrote, “A plan is now agitating making Treasury notes legal tender; 
this would be bankruptcy to begin with, the destruction of public and private 
credit, and all confidence between man and man.”  Others supported a legal 
tender act.  In a letter to President Davis on July 10, William C. Smedes of 
Vicksburg claimed that a legal tender law was the only refuge of merchants and 
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planters from the capitalists of the North and Europe.  Despite all this, there was 
no urgency to enact legal tender legislation in 1861.198 
At the beginning of 1862, as Government expenses ballooned, there was 
serious talk among the Permanent Confederate Congress of making paper 
currency legal tender.  In early March, a legal tender bill was introduced in the 
Senate.  The Senate asked Secretary Memminger to give his opinion of the bill.  
In a letter to L.J. Gatrell, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Memminger 
wrote,  
     Treasury notes are now the accepted currency of the whole country, and circulate at 
par with bank notes.  They, therefore, need no assistance at present to enable the to 
perform the function of legal tender.  A law of Congress making their acceptance 
compulsory, will immediately induce the enquiry into the reasons for such a law.  It will 
be asked Why enforce by penalty that which is freely done by every one?  And it will be 
difficult to escape the conclusion which will be drawn, that the law makers anticipate an 
expected refusal; and this anticipation involves suspicion of the notes…. It is plain that 
no law is necessary to produce a voluntary act.”199 
 
Ultimately, the Judiciary Committee of the House was divided on the 
constitutionality of the bill.  Five believed it was unconstitutional, while four 
believed it was constitutional.  Several other legal tender bills entered the House 
throughout the remainder of the war, but none passed.  Indeed, the only 
available record of Jefferson Davis’s views on legal tender indicates that he 
would have vetoed the motion.200 
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An Increase in Notes 
 
 In Memminger’s Report to Congress on March 14, 1862, he discussed the 
Treasury note situation.  As the expenditures for the next fiscal year were 
estimated at $215 million, Memminger recommended increasing the supply of 
Treasury notes by $50 million.  However, he understood the implications of this 
action,  
     Experience has also established that this is the most dangerous of all the methods of 
raising money.  The danger arises from the fact that, in borrowing money in this form, 
the government interferes with the measures of value.  The amount of currency usually 
circulating in a country forms its measures of value.  While this consists of gold and 
silver, it cannot become redundant, because any excess would immediately be exported 
to other countries.  But when a currency has no value except in one country, this security 
against excess is lost, and every addition becomes permanent circulation.  Every 
money-value must re-adjust itself to this increase, and the result is, that to obtain a 
comparatively small amount of money, the values of the entire property of the 
community are changed.  The government itself, in time of war, becomes the greatest 
sufferer…. it buys at inflated prices which itself has produced, and loses more in its 
payments than the amount it has attempted to raise by currency.  The relations of debtor 
and creditor are disturbed by every successive issue, and the result is the prostration of 
public credit and private confidence.  The facility with which a government paper 
currency may be issued, offers strong temptations to resort to it in difficult times.  But the 
disastrous consequences which have always attended its over-issue, warn us to mark 
with care the boundaries within which it should be confined.201 
 
 
In spite of his own advice, Memminger justified the increase in paper currency as 
the Government still held the confidence of the people.  In his words, “So long as 
the public confidence can be preserved, this effect would attend a currency 
receivable at all points par.”202  But he was leery of asking for any amount over 
                                                 
201
 C.G. Memminger, Review of the Financial Measures of the Provisional Government: March 
14, 1862, (Richmond, Treasury Department, 1862).  Historian Eugene M. Lerner paints an overly-
rosy picture of Memminger in this instance, alluding to his warning on the dangers of over-issue 
without mentioning his recommendation of an additional $50 million in Treasury notes.  
202
 Ibid.   
 87
$200 million, at which he urged Congress to “pause…until we can see the effects 
upon the country.”203 
 Congress enacted Memminger’s recommendation on April 18, 1862, again 
offering an exchange on notes for $50 million in 10-year, 6 percent Call 
Certificates—extended to $100 million on September 23.  These Call Certificates 
were quite successful.  By December 31, The Treasury had issued over $59 
million in Call Certificates.204 
 However, the Confederacy failed to unload its massive bond issue.  The 
only successful loan had been original $15 million loan.  On April 9, 1862, 
Memminger claimed that the current $181 million bond issue was an asset no 
power or skill could convert into cash.  Whenever a section was threatened by 
the enemy, the people would accept nothing but Treasury notes.  When the 
Secretary urged that war requisitions be paid for half cash and half bonds, 
officers reported that the owners of supplies would not accept any payment in 
bonds.  Friction developed between Memminger and the War and Navy 
Departments when they accused him of discrimination.  On May 10, 1862, 
Memminger stated that if the whole expense of the Government was settled in 
notes, they would exhaust their $50 million issue in sixty days.205  Indeed, by 
June, only a few million dollars remained unsubscribed on the $200 million note 
issue.  Memminger warned that if debts piled above this amount, the President 
must use executive power to meet the emergency.206 
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 On September 23, 1862, Congress made several reforms to the issue of 
bonds, notes and stocks.  They authorized Memminger to issue “such additional 
amount of the same as may be required to pay the appropriations made by 
Congress at its last and present sessions.”  Seven days later, Memminger 
showed the amount of issues at over $283 million, and claimed that he needed 
an additional $150 million to cover expenses by the end of the year, bringing the 
total to $433 million.207   
 In October, Memminger wrote to Davis, “When it is remembered that the 
circulation of all the Confederate States before the present war was less than 
100 millions, it becomes obvious that the large quantity of money in circulation 
today must produce depreciation and final disaster.”208  To abate the 
Confederacy’s swollen issue, the Secretary recommended a forced loan of 1/5 of 
all incomes, and a reduction in the interest rate on bonds fundable by Treasury 
notes.209 
 Congress ignored this first recommendation but approved the second.  On 
October 13, 1862, they approved “An act to reduce the rate of interest on the 
funded debt of the Confederate States.”  It stipulated that all notes issued after 
December 1, should be fundable in 7 percent bonds—a one percent drop.  The 
act’s sole purpose was to ease inflation.  Memminger admitted that this was an 
infringement on the contract written on each note, but stated, “A limitation of time 
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for the performance of contracts has never been considered an infringement 
where sufficient opportunity is given to claim performance.”210 
 As with the Produce Loan, there was a lack of cohesive fiscal strategy 
between departments.  Memminger’s financial plan competed with War and Navy 
officials who had substantial problems of their own.  Consider that in Arkansas in 
1862, Army funds and stores were almost depleted.  Indebtedness to civilian 
suppliers reached insurmountable levels.  In October 1862, General Theophilus 
Holmes wrote to Secretary George W. Randolph stating, “Certified accounts are 
scattered broadcast throughout the entire country, and many are held by persons 
in indigent circumstances, who, having sold to agents of the Government all their 
subsistence, have now neither provisions nor money with which to purchase 
what are required for the support of their families… The people refuse to sell any 
more to the Government on credit.”  Memminger’s suggestion that war 
requisitions be paid for half cash and half bonds would have provided little 
comfort for the civilian creditors.211   
 
Supply Shortage, Note Abundance 
 
 Shortages in food, supplies, and labor had plagued the Confederacy since 
the blockade.  The war robbed the South of a massive labor pool.  General 
Clement A. Evans estimated that 40 percent of white males military age had 
joined the army.  Now, with a precipitous increase in the money supply, the price 
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of many goods inflated to unobtainable levels.  Though the inflationary trend was 
acerbated by shortages, it also aggravated shortages.  For thirty-one months, 
from October 1861 to March 1864, the general price index in the Confederacy 
rose at a rate of 10 percent a month.  Prices rose much faster than wages.  On 
January 10, 1863, Memminger estimated that real incomes in the South had 
declined by 40 percent.  Southern laborers had to take on second jobs or work 
longer hours to maintain their prewar standard of living.  Even wives and children 
entered the workforce to supplement the family income.  By 1862, some firms 
demanded customers offer a commodity along with Treasury notes.  Many of the 
Confederacy’s poorer citizens went without food or clothing as they could not 
afford them.212   
 
Currency Reduction 
 
 As prices rose, so did Government expenses.  As the real value of money 
fell, lenders refused to extend credit without a guarantee of repayment in gold.   
By December 1862, Treasury notes were worth thirty-three cents to the gold 
dollar.  On January 10, 1863, Memminger recommended a two-thirds withdrawal 
of Treasury notes, “Prices will reach the height adjusted by the scale of issues, 
and they can only be restored to their usual condition by a return to the normal 
standard of currency.  In other words, the only remedy for an inflated currency is 
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a reduction of the circulating medium.”213  In an unfortunate irony, he also 
requested authority to issue an additional $200 million in Treasury notes to meet 
Government expenses.214 
  Congress embodied Memminger’s recommendations within the Act of 
March 23, 1863.  Congress stipulated that all notes fundable in 7 percent bonds 
were to be turned in August 1, 1863, that the December 1, 1862 issue was 
fundable in 4 percent bonds, and that Call Certificates would be converted into 
funded debt.  Congress also gave Memminger the authority to issue $50 million a 
month in non-interest bearing Treasury notes.   
 Neither the interest reduction of October 13, 1862 nor the currency 
reduction of March 23, 1863 succeeded in reducing the currency.  Though the 
Government sold over $224 million worth of 8 and 7 percent bonds before 
August 1, 1863, Memminger was issuing over $50 million a month to keep pace 
with government expenses.  Given the extensive military operations in the 
summer and fall of 1863, the March 23 reduction managed to remove just $21 
million in notes.  By September 30, 1863, non-interest bearing notes in circulation 
totaled $616 million.215   
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Shock and Demoralization 
 
 By the end of 1863, the Confederate currency had sunk so low that even 
the optimistic President Davis was alarmed.  In December, Treasury notes were 
worth just five cents to the gold dollar.  The public referred to them as “rags” and 
“fodder.”  One Georgian stated that, “An oak leaf will be worth just as much as 
the promise of the Confederate treasury to pay one dollar.”  That same year, 
United States greenbacks made their way into the South, competing with the 
Confederate issue.  It was a situation both humiliating and demoralizing for the 
Confederacy.  After the battle of Gettysburg, it took four Confederate dollars to 
purchase one greenback dollar.  In 1864, Congress passed a law forbidding 
transactions with U.S. notes, but the need for stable currency was so great that 
even the Government began collecting its own supply.216 
 
The Act of February 17, 1864 
 
 In his Report of December 7, 1863, Memminger again recommended a 
reduction in currency, “In the present expanded state of the currency it would not 
be expedient to reduce the circulation to its proper normal standard…. it is 
presumed that a reduction of the entire volume to 200 millions will be sufficient. 
After the war, measures may be adopted for such further reduction as may then 
be proper.”217  Memminger advocated four items:  exchanging outstanding 
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Treasury notes for a new issue of 6 percent, twenty-year bonds; requiring every 
note-holder to present their treasury notes for funding by April 1, 1864; abolishing 
the ability to pay taxes with the notes; and for the notes to remain only as 
evidence of debt payable after October 1, 1864.  The plan would allow for a three 
month delay for regions west of the Mississippi.  President Davis rallied behind 
his Secretary, asking Congress to give the matter their full and immediate 
attention.218  
 Congress, however, was full of competing and contradictory remedies.  
Those in opposition felt the Secretary’s policies put too great a value on Treasury 
notes.  They also objected to exchanging non-interest bearing Treasury notes for 
interest-bearing government securities.  Congressmen Frances S. Lyon and 
H.W. Bruce suggested levying a 50 percent tax on the currency, and fund the 
remainder in 5 or 6 percent bonds.  This proposal met with popular approval in 
the House.  Indeed, the idea of taxing currency was a disguised form of debt 
repudiation.  Under a proposed tax bill, the old issue could be exchanged for new 
notes or bonds on scales ranging between five and twenty-one.  The House 
voted to tax the notes, but the Senate rejected it.  Afterwards, a joint Senate-
House committee met to reach a compromise.219  
 On February 16, 1864, the Senate-House Conference Committee drafted 
a compromise bill that combined features of Memminger’s plan, coupled with 
several Congressional amendments.  The next day, Congress passed “An Act to 
reduce the currency and to authorize a new issue of notes and bonds.”  In what  
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Capers later described as “a jumble, resulting from confusion of ideas, that at 
best, was a compromise between opposing factions,” the act attempted to reduce 
Treasury notes by coercing note holders to either fund their notes in 20-year 4 
percent registered bonds or exchange them at a rate of 3:2. 220  Notes were 
divided into four classes: those of 50 cents, $1, and $2; notes of $5; notes above 
$5 but below $100; and notes above $100.  Fifty cent, $1 and $2 notes were 
unaffected.  Five dollar notes were received at par through either coercion 
scheme until July 1, east of the Mississippi, and October 1, west of the 
Mississippi.  After this, the notes were fundable at two-thirds their value until 
January 1, 1865, at which date the Government would tax them at 100 percent.  
Notes above $5 fell under a similar scheme but their receivable date was April 1, 
1864, east of the Mississippi, and July 1, 1864 west of the Mississippi.  One-
hundred dollar notes were only receivable in bonds.  Those not received by April 
1, and July 1 respectively were taxed at 33.3 percent plus 10 percent each month 
afterward until funded.  Notes above $100 were also taxed at 33.3 percent but 
were exchangeable for bonds until January 1.  Outside of illustrating how 
Memminger’s fiscal suggestions had to compete with Congress’s, at this late 
date, it mattered little what was suggested.221 
 The publication of the reduction act caused panic in commercial circles.  
Southerners attempted to reduce their cash, which drove already inflated prices 
higher.  The general price index in the South rose 23 percent in the month period 
between February and March, 1864.  On March 10, Governor Brown declared, 
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“The act has shaken the confidence in the justice and competence of Congress.  
The country was prepared to pay cheerfully a heavy tax, but it did not expect 
repudiation and bad faith.”222   
Currency reform took effect by May, 1864, and prices in the South fell 
between 10 and 50 percent.  Flour in Macon went from $125 to $75 dollars per 
sack.  Butter in Mobile went from $10 to $5 a pound. Theater tickets in Richmond 
went from $5 to $2.  These discounted prices remained for six months before 
rising back to pre-reform levels. 223   
The old currency, though nominally repudiated, circulated to the very end.  
Aided by a public indifference, it often held as much value as the new currency.  
Coulter describes the process enacted on the old currency, “All old money 
received by the Treasury was mutilated by a machine which bit out a semicircular 
hole and was then consigned to the furnace; but even so, now and then, a bill 
was secretly extracted on its road to destruction, patched up, and passed.”  Due 
to the imperfect record keeping of the Confederacy during its final years, there is 
reason to believe that the Government paid out some of the old issue.224  
 
Conclusion 
 
In November, 1864, newly appointed Secretary of the Treasury George 
Trenholm publicly declared the currency reform a failure. The next month, 
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Treasury notes were worth 2.6 cents to the gold dollar.  It was no secret that the 
Confederacy’s finances were irreversibly broken.  Months earlier, on April, 1864, 
Vice President Alexander H. Stephens spoke privately to Secretary of War 
Seddon, stating, “Our finances are now a wreck.  Past all hope, in my judgment.”  
At the same time, Congressman William W. Boyce of South Carolina also 
acknowledged that the South’s finances were ruined. 225  Fifty-four percent of the 
Confederacy’s total revenue came from the printing press.  Throughout 1861, 
Treasury notes were the Confederacy’s primary source of income.226  The failure 
in confining the currency within appropriate limits, and reducing its size when it 
became too large, were matters outside of Memminger’s control.  Both these 
factors relied on a shrewd and successful taxation program.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
225
 Ibid., 162.  
226
 R. Neil Fulghum, “The Southern Homefront 1861-1865.  Introduction: Moneys for the Southern 
Cause”  http://docsouth.unc.edu/imls/currency/index.html (Accessed April 12, 2009)  
 97
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
When Congress approved the Funding Act of February 1864—
substantially different from Memminger’s original plan—the Secretary stated his 
desire to resign.  In his words, “the public service would be promoted by the 
appointment of a successor whose views of financial policy accorded better… 
with the legislation… adopted.”227  President Davis objected to Memminger’s 
resignation, citing the difficulty in finding a suitable replacement on such short 
notice.  On May 27, Representative H.S. Foote of Tennessee introduced a 
resolution calling for the Secretary’s resignation.  The resolution was referred to 
the Committee of Ways and Means.  However, the Committee never made a 
report.  It was assumed that Memminger would resign at the end of the session. 
On June 15, 1864, Secretary Memminger resigned.  Reasons as to why 
he had not resigned immediately after the Funding Act were twofold.  The first 
was, “a repugnance to any act which could be construed into an abandonment of 
a post of duty assigned to me during a struggle in which I felt that every citizen 
owed to his country whatever sacrifice or service was demanded of him.” The 
funding machinery required for the act was so complex that “No new head of the 
Department, however competent, would have been able to acquire sufficient 
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knowledge of office details in time to have carried out the provisions of this 
act.”228  The second reason was the confidence placed in him by President 
Davis: “you honored me with such confidence as you have manifested… while 
your whole energies were still taxed by the great and varied responsibilities 
attendant upon the office in which Providence has placed you.”229   
The Confederacy’s economic structure was too primitive for a 
sophisticated financial policy.  A lack of paper and complex financial machinery 
saw economic programs move slowly.  A small number of wealthy planters held 
disproportionate influence in southern economic affairs.  They had no intention of 
being patriotic if it damaged their profits.  Also, southern economic isolation 
engendered by the Union blockade disrupted the cotton market. 
Southerners rigorously opposed taxation that was essential to providing a 
legitimate source of revenue to meet interest payments.  Taxes made up just 4 
percent of the Confederacy’s total revenue.  The Union, on the other hand, 
financed 20 percent of the war in taxes—a strategy sustainable for the long 
term.230   
Memminger’s financial wisdom was constantly at odds with a southern 
states’ rights, agrarian political ideology.  Here, Memminger is not blameless.  
His weak early financial schemes toed the party line, and he had the same 
optimistic expectations as the rest of Congress.  To Memminger’s credit, he 
fought hard to establish heavy taxes in 1863.  However, by then it was too late.   
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Even had Memminger been a brilliant financial mind with a gift for oratory, 
it would not have made any difference.  Considering how despised and 
mishandled the War Tax of 1861 was in the states, a supportive Congress could 
not sway public opinion mired in an antebellum slave-based, states’ rights, 
agrarian political economy.  Changes in public opinion take time—something the 
Confederacy did not have.  
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